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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for ArcelorMittal S.A. (MT) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-27): Designation Low · Gem Score -54 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality -18 · Value -78 · Sentiment -64 (timing only, not weighted)
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ArcelorMittal S.A.
MT NYSEArcelorMittal S.A. is a prominent global leader in the steel and mining industry. This multinational corporation, headquartered in Luxembourg, primarily focuses on the production of steel for various applications. It operates across a range of industries, including automotive, construction, household appliances, and packaging. ArcelorMittal is renowned for its comprehensive production capabilities, from raw material extraction to the completion of finished steel products. The company plays a crucial role in the global supply chain and is deeply integrated into the infrastructure development of many economies. Its extensive international footprint includes facilities and operations across the Americas, Europe, Africa, and Asia, showcasing its vast reach and influence in the market. ArcelorMittal's commitment to sustainability and innovation is evident in its investment in cutting-edge technologies to enhance production efficiency and reduce environmental impact. As the largest steel producer globally, ArcelorMittal's performance often reflects broader economic trends, making it a significant player to watch in the industrial sector. The company's exploration of renewable energy solutions and green steel production underscores its pivotal role in the transition towards greener practices in heavy industry.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
This company does not file structured financial statements with the U.S. SEC, so quarterly figures aren't available from our filings-based data engine. Annual figures shown here come from the sources that do cover it.
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 4.11
Total Equity: $56.54B
Shares: 766,000,000
Total Debt: $13.41B
Cash: $5.39B
EBITDA: $6.57B
Total Debt: $13.41B
Cash: $5.39B
Revenue: $61.35B
Revenue: $61.35B
Revenue: $61.35B
Total Equity: $56.54B
Tax Rate: 10.0%
Equity: $56.54B
Total Debt: $13.41B
Cash: $5.39B
Current Liabilities: $22.52B
Long-Term Debt: $10.67B
Total Debt: $13.41B
Total Equity: $56.54B
Shares: 766,000,000
Shares: 766,000,000
CapEx: -$4.34B
Shares: 766,000,000
Stock Price: $73.86
Net Income: $3.15B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 12:51pm (82d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $76.6B | $79.8B | $68.3B | $62.4B | $61.4B |
| Cost of Revenue | $57.3B | $67.3B | $63.5B | $56.7B | $57.0B |
| Gross Profit | $19.2B | $12.5B | $4.7B | $5.8B | $4.4B |
| Operating Expenses | $2.3B | $2.3B | $2.4B | $2.5B | $748.0M |
| Operating Income | $17.0B | $10.3B | $2.3B | $3.3B | $3.6B |
| Net Income | $15.0B | $9.3B | $919.0M | $1.3B | $3.2B |
| EBITDA | $19.5B | $12.9B | $5.0B | $5.9B | $6.6B |
| EPS | $13.53 | $10.21 | $1.09 | $1.70 | $4.13 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $13.49 | $10.18 | $1.09 | $1.69 | $4.11 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 12:51pm (82d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $4.2B | $9.3B | $7.7B | $6.4B | $5.4B |
| Total Current Assets | $34.9B | $37.1B | $33.2B | $29.4B | $30.6B |
| Total Assets | $90.5B | $94.5B | $93.9B | $89.4B | $97.7B |
| Current Liabilities | $24.2B | $22.4B | $21.8B | $21.8B | $22.5B |
| Long-Term Debt | $6.5B | $9.1B | $8.4B | $8.8B | $10.7B |
| Total Liabilities | $39.2B | $39.0B | $37.8B | $38.1B | $41.2B |
| Total Equity | $51.3B | $55.6B | $56.1B | $51.3B | $56.5B |
| Retained Earnings | $36.7B | $45.4B | $46.3B | $47.3B | $49.9B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 12:51pm (82d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $9.9B | $10.2B | $7.6B | $4.9B | $4.8B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$3.0B | -$3.5B | -$4.6B | -$4.4B | -$4.3B |
| Free Cash Flow | $6.9B | $6.7B | $3.0B | $447.0M | $471.0M |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$25.0M | -$939.0M | -$2.5B | -$184.0M | $47.0M |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | -$572.0M | -$663.0M | -$531.0M | -$580.0M | -$542.0M |
| Stock Buybacks | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Change in Cash | -$1.3B | $5.2B | -$1.9B | -$815.0M | -$1.5B |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 12:51pm (82d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +4.3% | -14.5% | -8.5% | -1.7% |
| Gross Profit Growth | -34.8% | -62.2% | +22.2% | -24.4% |
| Operating Income Growth | -39.5% | -77.2% | +41.5% | +9.6% |
| Net Income Growth | -37.8% | -90.1% | +45.7% | +135.4% |
| EBITDA Growth | -34.1% | -61.0% | +18.5% | +10.6% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 12:51pm (82d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-08-07 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
| 2026-05-13 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
| 2026-02-20 | $0.15 | — | — | — |
| 2025-11-13 | $0.28 | — | — | — |
| 2025-05-16 | $0.28 | — | — | — |
| 2024-11-12 | $0.25 | — | — | — |
| 2024-05-16 | $0.25 | — | — | — |
| 2023-11-13 | $0.22 | — | — | — |
| 2023-05-22 | $0.22 | — | — | — |
| 2022-05-13 | $0.38 | — | — | — |
| 2021-06-10 | $0.30 | — | — | — |
| 2019-05-16 | $0.20 | — | — | — |
| 2018-05-17 | $0.10 | — | — | — |
| 2015-05-07 | $0.51 | — | — | — |
| 2014-05-12 | $0.51 | — | — | — |
| 2013-05-10 | $0.51 | — | — | — |
| 2012-11-19 | $0.48 | — | — | — |
| 2012-08-20 | $0.48 | — | — | — |
| 2012-05-23 | $0.48 | — | — | — |
| 2012-02-16 | $0.48 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Not computed yetNarrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Growth Outlook
Analyzed 2026-08-17 16:20The question every valuation on this page silently assumes: is this company likely to grow? Judged forward — the business, its category, the world — against what's already printed.
Claude Reading
Looking at the raw numbers first: revenue has bled from $79.8B (2022) to $61.4B (2025), a 23% peak-to-trough decline, while net income collapsed from $14.96B (2021) to $3.15B (2025) — roughly a 79% haircut. Gross margins compressed from 25.1% (2021) to 7.1% (2025), and operating margins from 22.2% to 5.9%. Yet the 2025 result is a *recovery* from 2024's $1.34B in NI, so we're seeing an inflection off the trough, not a fresh collapse. FCF at $471M against $4.34B capex means capital return capacity is minimal — dividend is 0.4% yield, payout only 17%, so no imminent cut, but no juice either. Balance sheet is fine: $13.4B debt vs $56.5B equity, D/E of 0.24, current ratio 1.36. The "high debt/interest coverage" flag from the synthesis looks overstated to me — MT has been an aggressive deleverager for a decade.
Now the models. The synthesis pins fair value at $36–$41 and calls the stock 51% overvalued. I think this is wrong in *direction* and probably wrong in *magnitude*. Here's why: a $36 fair value implies steady-state earnings of roughly $2B on 18x, or $3B on 12x. MT already earned $3.15B in 2025 on what everyone acknowledges are trough conditions. Mid-cycle earnings for MT historically run $5–7B; even conservatively normalize to $4.5B and put a cyclical 10x on it and you get $45B market cap — below current $55.7B, but not by 50%. Put 12x on $5B and you're at $60B, right around spot. The DCF-driven $36 anchor is being computed off suppressed FCF ($471M) that is depressed by elevated decarbonization capex ($4.34B, well above maintenance) — that's a modeling artifact, not intrinsic value destruction. The P/B of 1.0x on $56.5B of tangible-heavy equity is the real anchor here, and it says the market is *not* paying a narrative premium; it's paying book.
The contrarian case against my read: Chinese overcapacity is genuinely structural (thesis eval top bear at 75 weight is right to flag it), and MT's ROIC of 5.1% and ROE of 5.6% are terrible even for a cyclical mid-point — if this *is* mid-cycle rather than trough, then the stock deserves to trade at book and the $36 DCF might actually be generous. The 85% earnings CAGR is a base-effect illusion off 2023's $919M nadir. Revenue is still declining YoY (-1.7%), which is inconsistent with a "trough behind us" story. And the "green steel" narrative genuinely is aspirational — European carbon border adjustment (CBAM) enforcement has been repeatedly weakened. If steel prices roll over in 2026 on China property drag continuing, earnings could easily halve again and the stock retests $50s.
Where I land: the synthesis and market forces engine are too bearish because they're extrapolating trough FCF and treating decarbonization capex as permanent cash destruction rather than a discretionary investment cycle. The narrative layer's assessment that "$74 embeds cyclical peak pricing" is inverted — 5.1% net margins and $3.15B NI are not peak-cycle numbers, they're low-mid cycle. The stock at 1.0x book, 0.9x sales, and 9.8x EV/EBITDA is priced for a modestly recovering cyclical, not a euphoric one. I dissent from the "overvalued to $36" verdict. My read is fairly valued to modestly undervalued in the $70–$85 range, with genuine downside to $50–55 if China dumps steel again and genuine upside to $95–100 if 2026 brings even a mild cyclical recovery + CBAM enforcement. This is a coin flip weighted slightly toward the upside because you're paying book value for the world's largest ex-China steelmaker with a deleveraged balance sheet. Not table-pounding, but the models here are anchoring on the wrong number.
GPT Reading
What jumps out first is that the current valuation is not obviously “deep value” on the actual earnings and cash flow on offer today. At $55.7B of market cap and about $63.7B of enterprise value after netting $5.4B of cash against $13.4B of debt, ArcelorMittal is trading at roughly 18x 2025 earnings, about 9.8x EV/EBITDA, 1.0x book, and nearly 0.9x sales. Those multiples might be fine for a decent industrial with durable mid-teens returns; they are not cheap for a steelmaker generating just 5.6% ROE and 5.1% ROIC in the latest year. The income statement tells a very cyclical, low-quality story: revenue fell from $79.8B in 2022 to $61.4B in 2025, while operating income dropped from $10.3B to $3.6B. Yes, net income recovered from $919M in 2023 to $3.15B in 2025, but that recovery still leaves earnings only about one-fifth of the 2021 peak and one-third of the 2022 level. Paying book value for a commodity producer only makes sense if that book can earn materially above cost of capital; the latest returns do not show that.
The bigger problem is cash generation. 2025 operating cash flow was $4.81B, but capex consumed $4.34B, leaving just $471M of free cash flow. On the current market cap, that is an FCF yield under 1%. For a cyclical steel business, that is a severe mismatch. Bulls will argue capex is temporarily elevated and should support higher future profitability, but until that is visible, the stock is being priced on hoped-for normalization rather than delivered owner earnings. Even giving credit for a solid balance sheet relative to the industry—net debt is only about $8.0B and debt/equity is 0.24—the equity still looks expensive because the balance sheet strength is already capitalized. This is not a distressed steel company mispriced at half of liquidation value; it is a financially sound steel company being valued as though mid-cycle earnings power is comfortably above what 2025 demonstrates.
The raw operating progression also undermines the idea that the market is simply looking through a trough. Gross margin was 25.1% in 2021, 15.7% in 2022, then just 6.9% in 2023, 9.3% in 2024, and 7.1% in 2025. That is not a clean rebound path; it is a business still struggling to convert revenue into profit in a harsher cost and pricing environment. Operating margin improved from 3.4% in 2024 to 5.9% in 2025, but gross profit actually fell from $5.79B to $4.38B despite only a modest revenue decline, implying the net income improvement likely benefited from below-the-line factors or cost actions that may not be durable. I do not buy the simplistic “P/E is high because earnings are depressed” excuse unless I can also see compelling evidence that normalized earnings are much higher. The last three years instead suggest normalized earnings may be far closer to $2B-$4B than to the $9B-$15B earned in the post-pandemic windfall.
The best argument against my skepticism is straightforward: this company has survived the downshift without balance-sheet stress, and if steel spreads improve even modestly, earnings torque is large. At 1.0x book and only 0.92x sales, the shares are not optically frothy. Net debt of about $8B is manageable versus $56.5B of equity, and 2025 net income more than doubled year over year from $1.34B to $3.15B despite lower revenue, showing management can protect the bottom line. If 2025 capex is unusually heavy, then free cash flow could snap back sharply; a move from $0.5B to even $3B-$4B of FCF would transform the valuation optics. A smart bull would also note that 2021-2022 proved this asset base can throw off extraordinary cash in tighter steel markets, so the stock has embedded optionality to any supply discipline, China stimulus, trade protection, or industrial demand surge. I weigh that less heavily because commodity optionality is not the same as franchise value, and the market is already paying a full price for that option.
What would change my mind is evidence that 2025 is indeed a cash-flow trough rather than the new mid-cycle. Concretely, I would want to see operating margin hold above 7% and free cash flow move sustainably above $2.5B without levering up the balance sheet; that would put the stock on a mid-single-digit FCF yield and support a valuation closer to today’s price. I would also revisit the bear case if ROIC climbs back toward 8%-10% while capex moderates from $4.34B, because then book value would deserve a premium rather than merely par. Until those numbers show up, I think the stock is priced as if the recovery is already established when the reported data still looks like a low-return cyclical struggling to earn its keep.
Grok Reading
ArcelorMittal’s financials describe a classic late-cycle industrial that has already surrendered most of its peak earnings power and is now being asked to fund a multi-year capital reset on thin free cash flow. Revenue has slid from $79.84B in 2022 to $61.35B in 2025, a cumulative contraction of roughly 23 percent, while net income—though sharply higher year-over-year at $3.15B versus $1.34B in 2024 and $919M in 2023—remains barely one-fifth of the $14.96B earned in 2021. Gross margin has compressed from the mid-20s to 7.1 percent and operating margin sits at 5.9 percent; the resulting ROE of 5.6 percent and ROIC of 5.1 percent are below any reasonable cost of capital for a global steelmaker. Operating cash flow of $4.81B looks adequate until capex of $4.34B leaves free cash flow of only $471M, a sub-1 percent FCF yield on the $55.7B equity value. At 18× trailing earnings, 1.0× book and 9.8× EV/EBITDA, the market is capitalizing a still-depressed but recovering profit base as if mid-cycle returns and cash conversion are already secured. That is the core mispricing: investors are paying peak-cycle multiples for trough-to-mid earnings while the balance-sheet capacity is being absorbed by heavy reinvestment rather than returned to shareholders.
The prior models correctly flag the narrative premium—roughly a doubling of a mid-cycle DCF near $36–41—but they overstate balance-sheet fragility. Net debt is only about $8B against $56.5B of equity (debt-to-equity 0.24), so the “high debt risk” label is not supported by the numbers; liquidity and leverage are fine. The real vulnerability is cash conversion and return on capital, not solvency. Earnings CAGR of 85 percent and the 135 percent jump in recent NI are optically impressive yet rest on an extremely low base and have not translated into free cash; revenue CAGR of –5.2 percent and FCF CAGR of –60.6 percent are the more durable signals. Chinese overcapacity remains structural, European energy costs have permanently lifted the cost curve, and the green-steel capex program is diluting near-term returns without yet producing priced-in pricing power. On normalized mid-cycle net income of roughly $3.5–4.5B, a 10–12× multiple and a 0.7–0.85× book multiple both point to equity value in the mid-$40s to low-$50s, well below the $73.86 print.
The strongest opposing case is straightforward and must be weighed. Steel equities are operating-leverage machines: a $50–100 per tonne lift in realized prices can double earnings inside a year, and MT already demonstrated that path from 2023 to 2025. Trading at exactly book value with a fortress balance sheet historically marks the zone where patient capital accumulates, not where it exits; true cycle bottoms have printed closer to 0.5–0.6× tangible book. If China stimulus tightens scrap and iron-ore balances, or if carbon-border adjustments actually ration Chinese imports into Europe, MT’s scale and partially decarbonized asset base could sustain mid-cycle ROE closer to 10–12 percent rather than the current 5–6 percent. In that scenario the 18× multiple on recovering earnings becomes mid-cycle 8–10× forward, and $74 is no longer expensive. The bull also notes that P/S of 0.92× embeds little revenue growth optimism, so the multiple risk is concentrated in margins and FCF, not top-line disappointment.
That upside path is real but is already the embedded bet, not a free option. I therefore stay on the side of overvaluation: the stock discounts a durable margin recovery and FCF inflection that the last three years of data have not yet delivered. What would flip the view is sustained free cash flow above $2.5–3B (implying capex discipline or volume recovery), gross margin holding above 11–12 percent for four consecutive quarters, and clear evidence that Chinese net exports are structurally declining rather than merely pausing. Absent those prints, $73.86 remains a rich price for a 5 percent ROIC steel business.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
ArcelorMittal is a classic mature cyclical caught on the wrong side of the steel cycle. Revenue has fallen every year since the 2022 peak ($79.8B to $61.4B), gross margin has compressed from 25.1% in 2021 to 7.1% in 2025, and net income has cratered from $14.96B to $3.15B. Operating margin at 5.9% is a shadow of the 22.2% posted in 2021. This is the shape of a commodity trough, not a broken business, but there is nothing in the trajectory that suggests durable pricing power or a widening moat. Earnings integrity is a genuine strength: accruals -1.6% of assets, OCF/NI of 3.05x, Beneish M at -2.41 all indicate the reported profits are real and, if anything, conservatively stated. Share count has been steadily reduced from 1.11B to 766M (-31% over five years), which is real per-share value creation and disciplined capital return. Altman Z at 2.38 sits in the grey zone - not distress, but not fortress either, consistent with a capital-intensive cyclical. The soft spot is cash conversion in the down-cycle. FCF has collapsed from $6.90B in 2021 to $471M in 2025 despite $3.15B of net income, meaning current FCF/NI is only ~15% - the opposite of the OCF/NI signal and a sign that working capital and capex are eating the cycle's meager earnings. For a heavy-industrial with grey-zone solvency, that thin FCF cushion in a trough year is the main quality concern.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Working capital movements and capex intensity in 2024-2025 explaining the NI-to-FCF gap
- Debt maturity schedule and net leverage vs EBITDA at trough
- Whether buybacks were funded from cash or incremental debt
- Segment/geographic exposure and any evidence of pricing power in specialty products
- Pension and environmental liabilities not visible in headline balance sheet
The composite fair value sits at $40.68 and the signal-adjusted FV at $35.96, implying about -51% downside from the $73.86 print. The DCF ($13.02) and EPV floor ($25.56) both scream that the through-cycle earnings power of a commodity steelmaker does not support today's price; only the anchored-PE method ($111.11) points the other way, and that is exactly the method most easily fooled by peak-cycle EPS being extrapolated - it should be discounted heavily here. Company-quality is Mixed (score -18) with FCF having collapsed from $6.9B to $471M in four years while net income stayed positive, which is the classic tell of a cyclical top being capitalized as if it were normal earnings. A reasonable deserved value blending EPV floor with a modest cyclical premium lands in the $30-45 zone. Against $73.86, that is a rich-to-overvalued setup: buyers here are paying a ~2x premium to EPV and effectively underwriting that current spread economics persist. The bull case (green steel, structural demand, consolidation) is real but aspirational and largely priced in; the bear case (commodity mean reversion, peak-EPS optics) has the math on its side. Honest read: not a fat short, but not a value setup either - this is late-cycle pricing on a mid-quality cyclical.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Normalized mid-cycle EBITDA per ton assumption vs latest guidance
- Sustainable capex for decarbonization and its drag on FCF
- Working capital swings distorting recent FCF prints
- Segment mix - how much of EBITDA is from higher-quality NAFTA/Europe flat vs commodity long products
- Any one-off impairments or tax items inflating recent EPS
The macro tape is mildly risk-on with VIX at 14 and the S&P near highs, which normally amplifies a beta-1.75 name to the upside. But the pressure landing on MT specifically is not clean: the active narrative is cyclical-late-stage with fragile durability and low cult coefficient, meaning there is no true-believer base to defend the story on any wobble. Steel is exactly the archetype that gets sold first when the growth story cracks, and rates at 4.63% with a stretched market PE add a slow-drip headwind to capital-intensive commodity names. Momentum is already rolling over (-5.2% CAGR, cash generation weakening), which tells you the tape is already marking this down even while the broader index holds up. Analyst tone and news flow are quiet - no fresh upgrades, no green-steel catalyst, no infrastructure headline to reignite the bull story. In a fragile narrative regime, silence is a headwind because the story needs feeding to hold a premium multiple. Net: the risk-on backdrop is a modest tailwind, but the stock-specific forces (fading narrative, weakening momentum, late-cycle archetype, high beta into any macro wobble) outweigh it.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Any China stimulus or infrastructure headline that could reignite the steel demand narrative
- Sell-side target revisions or a downgrade cluster that would confirm fading tone
- Steel spot prices and spreads - the real-time tell for whether late-cycle pricing power is holding
- A shift in the risk regime (VIX break above 18 or 10y above 4.8%) that would punish high-beta cyclicals disproportionately
- Green-steel policy or customer commitment news that could refresh narrative durability
Steel remains policy- and geography-determined, not technology-disrupted. Two forces dominate the next 24 months: Chinese overcapacity exporting deflation into every open market, and Western trade/carbon walls (EU CBAM, US Section 232-style tariffs) rebuilding regional price islands. MT is unusually well placed for that bifurcation — it owns capacity inside both protected blocs plus low-cost Indian growth — but the same walls raise its own decarbonization capex bill. Energy-transition demand (grid steel, wind plate, EV silicon steel) is real but too small yet to offset flat construction. Higher-for-longer rates keep the construction demand pool subdued. Net: a business whose earnings power is recovering toward a mid-cycle level that is structurally below the 2021-22 peak.
When we made this prediction on Aug 16, 2026, MT was $73.86. We expect it to be $56.00 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $40.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 16, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.