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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Eni S.p.A. (E) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-27): Designation Low · Gem Score -31 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality -21 · Value -37 · Sentiment 3 (timing only, not weighted)
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
price-history,income-trend,key-metrics,financials(statement tables),insider-trading. The analysis above is public; the raw data tables require a free account.
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raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
Eni S.p.A.
E NYSEEni S.p.A. Sponsored ADR is a negotiable certificate traded in U.S. dollars that represents two ordinary shares of Eni S.p.A., an Italian energy company headquartered in Rome. Issued with the support of Citibank N.A. - Milan Branch as the depositary bank, it enables U.S. investors to gain exposure to Eni without directly purchasing shares on foreign exchanges. Eni S.p.A. operates across integrated energy sectors, including Exploration & Production, where it explores and develops oil and natural gas fields in over 40 countries such as Italy, Libya, Egypt, Norway, the UK, Angola, Congo, Nigeria, the United States, Kazakhstan, Algeria, Australia, Venezuela, Iraq, Ghana, and Mozambique. The Gas & Energy segment handles natural gas supply, liquefied natural gas (LNG), and power generation. Additionally, the Refining & Marketing division focuses on refining, marketing petroleum products, petrochemicals, plastics, and elastomers, alongside commodity trading. This ADR plays a key role in bridging international energy markets, offering access to Eni's global operations in hydrocarbons, renewables integration, and energy transition initiatives.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
Eni S.p.A. is a foreign private issuer — it reports to the U.S. SEC once a year (on Form 20-F or 40-F) rather than filing the quarterly statements (10-Q) that U.S.-domiciled companies must submit. Our financial statements are read directly from SEC filings, so for this company only annual figures exist at the source.
This is a property of how the company files, not missing or broken data — its filing history shows 9 annual reports, the latest filed 2026-03-23, and no quarterly filings . The company may still publish quarterly results on its own investor-relations site.
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 0.90
Total Equity: $60.93B
Shares: 3,088,079,988
Total Debt: $28.93B
Cash: $9.35B
EBITDA: $14.27B
Total Debt: $28.93B
Cash: $9.35B
Revenue: $94.82B
Revenue: $94.82B
Revenue: $94.82B
Total Equity: $60.93B
Tax Rate: 52.3%
Equity: $60.93B
Total Debt: $28.93B
Cash: $9.35B
Current Liabilities: N/A
Long-Term Debt: $23.25B
Total Debt: $28.93B
Total Equity: $60.93B
Shares: 3,088,079,988
Shares: 3,088,079,988
CapEx: -$10.04B
Shares: 3,088,079,988
Stock Price: $55.42
Net Income: $3.01B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 10:20am (82d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $88.4B | $153.0B | $108.2B | $102.5B | $94.8B |
| Cost of Revenue | — | — | — | — | — |
| Gross Profit | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Expenses | — | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income | $14.2B | $20.2B | $9.5B | $6.0B | $5.8B |
| Net Income | $6.7B | $16.0B | $5.5B | $3.0B | $3.0B |
| EBITDA | $22.4B | $28.5B | $18.2B | $14.8B | $14.3B |
| EPS | $1.86 | $4.57 | $1.63 | $0.91 | $0.90 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $1.85 | $4.56 | $1.62 | $0.90 | $0.90 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 10:20am (82d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $9.5B | $11.7B | $11.8B | $9.4B | $9.3B |
| Total Current Assets | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Assets | $159.0B | $175.6B | $164.6B | $169.6B | $158.2B |
| Current Liabilities | — | — | — | — | — |
| Long-Term Debt | $27.4B | $22.4B | $25.1B | $24.9B | $23.2B |
| Total Liabilities | $107.6B | $111.8B | $102.7B | $105.4B | $97.3B |
| Total Equity | $51.4B | $63.7B | $61.9B | $64.2B | $60.9B |
| Retained Earnings | — | — | — | — | — |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 10:20am (82d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $14.8B | $20.2B | $17.5B | $15.1B | $15.4B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$5.7B | -$8.9B | -$10.1B | -$9.2B | -$10.0B |
| Free Cash Flow | $9.1B | $11.3B | $7.4B | $5.9B | $5.3B |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$2.2B | -$1.9B | -$1.5B | -$2.1B | -$226.2M |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Change in Cash | -$1.3B | $2.2B | $27.7M | -$2.3B | $274.7M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 10:20am (82d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +73.0% | -29.3% | -5.2% | -7.5% |
| Gross Profit Growth | — | — | — | — |
| Operating Income Growth | +41.9% | -52.8% | -36.6% | -4.4% |
| Net Income Growth | +138.6% | -65.6% | -45.0% | -0.6% |
| EBITDA Growth | +27.4% | -36.3% | -18.4% | -3.7% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 10:21am (82d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-05-19 | $0.63 | — | — | — |
| 2026-03-24 | $0.61 | — | — | — |
| 2025-05-20 | $0.57 | — | — | — |
| 2025-03-25 | $0.52 | — | — | — |
| 2024-11-19 | $0.54 | — | — | — |
| 2024-09-24 | $0.54 | — | — | — |
| 2024-05-20 | $0.50 | — | — | — |
| 2024-03-18 | $0.52 | — | — | — |
| 2023-11-20 | $0.49 | — | — | — |
| 2023-09-18 | $0.53 | — | — | — |
| 2023-05-22 | $0.47 | — | — | — |
| 2023-03-20 | $0.47 | — | — | — |
| 2022-11-21 | $0.45 | — | — | — |
| 2022-09-19 | $0.45 | — | — | — |
| 2022-05-23 | $0.92 | — | — | — |
| 2021-09-20 | $1.00 | — | — | — |
| 2021-05-24 | $0.58 | — | — | — |
| 2020-09-21 | $0.28 | — | — | — |
| 2020-05-18 | $0.95 | — | — | — |
| 2019-09-23 | $0.94 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Not computed yetNarrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
Independent read on the raw numbers first: Eni generated $94.8B revenue in 2025 with $3.01B net income — a 3.2% net margin and 4.9% ROE. That's mediocre but not catastrophic for an integrated major in a softer commodity year. Revenue is down from the $153B 2022 spike but 2025 is actually 7% above 2021's $88B, so the "decline" is really normalization off a war-driven peak, not secular collapse. Operating CF of $15.4B against a $79.5B market cap is a 19% CFO yield — that is not a distressed-cash-generation profile. FCF of $5.3B covers the ~$3.4B dividend (4.2% yield × $79.5B) at roughly 1.6x. Net debt of $19.6B against $60.9B equity (D/E 0.47) is unremarkable for the sector. This is a mature, cyclically-depressed integrated major, not a melting ice cube.
The synthesis verdict of $18.58 fair value (-66.5% downside) is, frankly, absurd and I dissent hard. A DCF that outputs one-third of book value ($60.9B equity / 2.76B shares ≈ $22/share book, and Eni trades at 2.8x P/B per the metrics but that ratio looks inconsistent with an $18 fair value unless the model is using ADR share count wrong or grossly mis-normalizing mid-cycle earnings). At $18.58, Eni would trade at ~0.85x book, ~3.5x operating CF, and a 12%+ dividend yield — pricing that implies imminent dividend cut and terminal decline. The Market Forces claim of "sub-1x interest coverage" is not supported by the file: $5.78B operating income on ~$29B debt implies interest coverage well above 3x at any reasonable rate. That signal appears fabricated or drawn from a different entity. Similarly "unsustainable dividend" contradicts the $5.3B FCF vs ~$3.4B payout math.
The contrarian case against MY read: the 61.6x P/E is real and reflects that 2025 earnings are trough-cycle. If you normalize to a mid-cycle $6-8B net income (between 2023's $5.5B and 2022's $16B), you get $2.20-2.90 normalized EPS and a mid-cycle P/E of 19-25x — still not cheap for an oil major with -6.4% revenue CAGR and ROIC of 3.4%. European majors deserve a discount to XOM/CVX for transition capex drag, and Eni's ROIC of 3.4% is genuinely weak — below cost of capital, meaning the business is destroying value on incremental investment. The narrative layer's "cyclical-late-stage" tag is fair; buying integrated oil at what may be mid-to-late cycle with softening crude is not obvious alpha. The pre-flight thesis that this trades at a discount to US majors is correct and probably persists.
Where the data is thin: no quarterly revenue trajectory is shown, so I can't verify whether 2025 is stabilizing or still deteriorating. Gross margin is missing across all years, which for an integrated is less critical (refining spreads dominate) but still a gap. The 61.6x P/E is a snapshot of a cyclical trough — using it as a valuation anchor is a category error, and the synthesis model appears to have fallen into exactly that trap. The FMP data may also be conflating Eni SpA parent financials with ADR share economics; the market cap of $79.5B at $55.42 implies ~1.43B ADR-equivalent shares, roughly consistent with Eni's ~3.27B ordinary shares at 2 ords per ADR (~$27 per ordinary × 3.27B = $88B, close enough). So the price/cap check passes, but the $18 DCF still looks like a normalization error, not signal.
GPT Reading
What stands out first is how far reported earnings have fallen from the 2022 windfall while the equity value has not reset enough to reflect that new baseline. Revenue has slid from $152.95B in 2022 to $108.17B in 2023, $102.49B in 2024, and $94.82B in 2025. Operating income has compressed even harder, from $20.21B in 2022 to $9.53B, then $6.05B and $5.78B. Net income is now just $3.01B, barely changed from $3.03B in 2024 but down more than 80% from the peak $16.03B. At a $79.49B market cap, that means investors are paying 61.6x current earnings, 1.8x sales, and 13.1x EV/EBITDA for an integrated oil major generating a 3.2% net margin and 6.1% operating margin. Those are not distressed-multiple numbers; they are rich numbers for a cyclical business whose earnings power has visibly rolled over.
The cash flow line is better than the income statement, but not good enough to rescue the valuation. Operating cash flow of $15.39B against capex of $10.04B leaves $5.34B of free cash flow, which implies an FCF yield of roughly 6.7% on the current market cap. That is respectable, but for a European oil company with declining revenue, shrinking returns, and clear commodity exposure, I do not think “respectable” supports a $79B equity valuation. Return metrics are weak: ROE 4.9%, ROIC 3.4%, ROA 1.9%. Balance sheet leverage is manageable rather than alarming — $28.93B of debt against $9.35B cash and $60.93B equity, or net debt around $19.6B — so I do not buy the most extreme “financial distress” framing. But the absence of distress is not a bullish thesis. If normalized earnings are around $3B and normalized FCF is around $5B-$6B, this looks more like a mature utility-like hydrocarbon franchise that should trade on yield and asset backing, not at a premium multiple.
That is where I part ways with the more dramatic model outputs. Calling Eni a collapse story headed to an $18 stock overstates the evidence. The company still produced $15.39B of operating cash flow in 2025, still funds over $10B of annual capex internally, still carries a moderate debt-to-equity ratio of 0.47, and still pays a 4.2% dividend that is not obviously uncovered by free cash flow. This is not a broken balance sheet. The issue is simpler: the stock price appears to be capitalizing either a rebound in commodity economics or a much higher through-cycle earnings level than the current accounts justify. On present numbers, book value is $60.93B and the company trades at 2.8x book despite sub-5% ROE. That combination usually needs confidence in a coming profit recovery. Maybe that happens, but it is not in the data yet.
The best counterargument is that current accounting earnings are artificially depressed relative to true owner economics, and integrated majors should be judged on cash generation and optionality, not P/E at a cyclical trough. A bull would point to $5.34B of FCF even after heavy investment, net debt that is tolerable, and the fact that 2025 net income held flat year over year despite another 7.5% revenue decline. They would also argue that 2022 was not just a freak spike but a reminder of embedded torque to gas, LNG, and European energy security, so paying 13x EV/EBITDA on depressed EBITDA could be reasonable if margins recover even partway toward 2023 levels. I weigh that differently because the trend since 2022 has been persistent, not one bad year: sales down four years from peak, operating profit down three straight years, and no evidence in the supplied data that returns are inflecting upward. If I have to underwrite a cyclical rebound to make 2.8x book and 61x earnings work, I would rather demand a cheaper entry.
What would change my mind is straightforward. If Eni can show revenue stabilization and profit recovery — for example, annual revenue back above $100B, operating income recovering toward $8B-$10B, and free cash flow sustaining above $7B-$8B without levering up — then today’s price would look much more defendable, especially with the dividend on top. Alternatively, if the stock fell into the low-$40s while free cash flow stayed near $5B and net debt remained controlled, the valuation would start to compensate for the cyclicality. Until one of those happens, the market is paying too much for a business whose recent numbers say “shrinking but solvent,” not “cheap.”
Grok Reading
The numbers describe a classic post-supercycle comedown, not a balance-sheet collapse. Revenue has slid from the 2022 war-spike peak of $152.95B to $94.82B in 2025, a roughly 38% drawdown, while net income cratered from $16.03B to $3.01B and operating income from $20.21B to $5.78B. That compression produced the ugly trailing CAGRs (−6.4% revenue, −26.1% earnings, −14.8% FCF) and the sub-scale returns now on the scoreboard: 4.9% ROE, 3.4% ROIC, 6.1% operating margin, 3.2% net margin. Yet the cash engine is still turning. Operating cash flow of $15.39B funded $10.04B of capex and left $5.34B of free cash flow—enough to cover a 4.2% dividend yield on the $79.5B equity value with room to spare. Net debt of about $19.6B against that OCF run-rate is leverage a solvent integrated can carry; debt-to-equity of 0.47 is not distress. The market is therefore paying a rich multiple—stated P/E near 62x, EV/EBITDA 13.1x, P/S 1.8x—on trough-cycle earnings power for a European major facing transition drag and peer lag. That is expensive, not insolvent.
The prior stack overreaches. Calling the name a “financially distressed value trap” with “sub-1x interest coverage” and an $18–20 fair value (implying a two-thirds haircut and deep discount to the $60.9B book equity) collides with the same briefing’s “Strong Cash Flow Quality” flag and with simple coverage arithmetic: $5.8B of operating profit on ~$29B of debt does not look like a refinancing emergency. The 198% premium-to-DCF narrative treats normalized hydrocarbon prices as permanently impaired and European regulatory risk as fatal; both are real headwinds, but they are already visible in the compressed returns and in the persistent discount to U.S. majors. What stands out is multiple fragility on cyclically depressed earnings, not imminent equity impairment. At roughly 6.7% FCF yield the stock is a bond-proxy with commodity torque, not a melting ice cube priced for zero terminal value.
The strongest case against this read is the valuation surface itself and the trajectory underneath it. A 13x EV/EBITDA and mid-teens-to-sixties earnings multiple are simply not what late-cycle integrated oils are supposed to clear when revenue is still falling 7.5% year-on-year, ROIC sits at 3.4%, and the sector complex is labeled as facing macro and peer-relative headwinds. A smart opponent would also note that European domicile plus energy-transition policy raises the cost of capital and the stranded-asset probability in a way U.S. peers do not face, so mean-reversion in oil prices alone may not restore mid-cycle multiples. They would argue the 4.2% yield is the only reason the stock has a bid, and that any cut—or any sustained sub-$70 oil that pushes FCF under the dividend—removes the floor. I weigh that evidence as justifying a discount and a modest overvaluation call, not a two-thirds write-down: the balance sheet and FCF coverage still refute the distress framing, and book value plus replacement-cost logic put a higher soft floor under the equity than an $18 DCF implies.
I would flip toward undervalued if trailing FCF re-expands above ~$8B with ROIC back through 8%, or if management demonstrates durable upstream volume growth (especially LNG/Africa) that stabilizes revenue above $110B without another price spike. I would flip harder bearish—and closer to the model’s deep-value-trap call—if the dividend is cut, if net debt rises while OCF falls under $12B, or if oil settles into a sub-$60 regime that locks net margins near 3% with no offsetting buybacks or asset sales.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Eni is a self-funding integrated oil and gas major producing $5.34B FCF on $94.82B revenue in 2025, with $9.35B liquid cash offset by roughly $29B of debt (net cash -$19.59B). Earnings quality looks clean on the surface - OCF/NI of 3.35x and accruals at -5.9% of assets suggest reported profits are backed by real cash, and the diluted share count has fallen from 3.57B in 2021 to 3.09B in 2025 (-3.6% CAGR), so per-share value is being concentrated rather than diluted. That is a genuinely shareholder-friendly capital allocation posture for an oil major. The concerns are structural. Operating margin has collapsed from 16.1% in 2021 to 6.1% in 2025, net income has fallen from $16.03B (2022) to $3.01B (2025), and FCF has stepped down each year from $11.27B (2022) to $5.34B (2025). Some of that is commodity price mean-reversion, but the trajectory is consistently down, not cyclical noise around a stable mean. Altman Z of 1.21 flags distress-zone leverage for an asset-heavy business; while integrated majors routinely score poorly on Altman, the net debt of ~$19.6B against declining cash generation is a real constraint. The business is functional and shareholder-aware, but profitability is thinning and the balance sheet is a constraint rather than a cushion.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Reserve replacement ratio and upstream production trajectory in the 10-K equivalent
- Debt maturity schedule and covenant terms given net debt of ~$19.6B
- Dividend coverage math and payout policy versus $5.34B FCF
- Whether buyback pace is sustainable if commodity prices weaken further
- Capex intensity and energy-transition capital commitments (Plenitude, Enilive) that may pressure FCF
- Segment margin detail - is the margin erosion in refining/chemicals or upstream?
The e2e synthesis screams overvalued: composite FV $20.44, signal-adjusted $18.58, implying -66% downside from $55.52. But the components are suspect for an integrated oil major - DDM at $15.25 and EPV at $18.86 penalize a cyclical business at trough earnings, and even the DCF at $28.93 sits well below where peers (XOM, CVX, SHEL, TTE) trade on cash flow. A market cap of $79B for a company generating multi-billion in operating cash and shrinking share count 3.6%/yr is not obviously priced for perfection - it is priced roughly in line with European majors on EV/EBITDA and yield (4%+).
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Normalized mid-cycle EBITDA and free cash flow versus current run-rate
- Net debt trajectory and coverage of dividend + buyback at $60-70 Brent
- African upstream production ramp guidance and capex intensity
- Any writedowns or stranded-asset commentary on legacy assets
- Sensitivity of DDM inputs - the $15 output implies a very low terminal growth or high discount rate
The macro tape is mildly risk-on (regime +47, VIX 15.5) which is a general tailwind for equities, but with beta 0.25 Eni barely feels it - the tape neither rescues nor punishes this name. The active narrative is the more relevant force: a cyclical-late-stage story with strong intensity but fragile durability, leaning on geopolitical scarcity, European energy security post-Russia, and LNG supply tightness. The Cronos FID with TotalEnergies in Cyprus and the Kutei Northern Hub subsea award directly feed that LNG/upstream-scarcity narrative, and energy stocks advanced premarket - all incremental tailwind. On the other side, the story is explicitly flagged as fragile: a big premium to intrinsic anchored on sustained high energy prices, with weakening cash generation and negative price momentum (-6.4% CAGR) suggesting the market is already quietly de-rating the cyclical peak. Higher rates (10y 4.65%) and a stretched market PE add a background headwind, though again dulled by the low beta. Net: a real but not decisive LNG/security tailwind is being offset by fading momentum and a fragile narrative that could crack on any oil-price rollover - roughly balanced, with the slightest lean to tailwind on this week's news flow.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Oil and European TTF gas price direction over next 4-6 weeks - the fragile narrative lives or dies here
- Any sell-side target revisions or downgrades framing Eni as cyclical-peak vs energy-security compounder
- Progress/news flow on Cronos LNG and African upstream projects that keep the scarcity story alive
- Signs of sector rotation out of energy back into growth if rates roll over
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
When we made this prediction on Jul 15, 2026, E was $49.55. We expect it to be $48.12 by Jan 2027, and we consider it great value under $42.00. This is an early model (v0.3.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Jul 15, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.