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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Mondelez International, Inc. (MDLZ) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-09-11): Designation Low · Gem Score -34 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 19 · Value -70 · Sentiment -26 (timing only, not weighted)
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Mondelez International, Inc.
MDLZ NASDAQMondelez International, Inc. is a global snack food company focused on manufacturing and marketing a broad portfolio of well-known branded products. Mondelez International, Inc. sells biscuits, baked snacks, chocolate, gum, and candy, along with selected cheese, grocery, and powdered beverage products in certain markets. Its brands include Oreo, Ritz, belVita, LU, Cadbury Dairy Milk, Milka, Toblerone, and CLIF Bar, giving the company a strong presence across everyday snacking occasions. The business serves consumers through supermarkets, convenience stores, wholesalers, mass merchandisers, and digital retail channels, supported by a wide distribution network. Mondelez International, Inc. is a major participant in the packaged snacks and confectionery market, with operations spanning North America, Europe, Latin America, and the Asia, Middle East, and Africa region.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 1.89
Total Equity: $25.89B
Shares: 1,298,000,000
Total Debt: $2.69B
Cash: $2.20B
EBITDA: $4.91B
Total Debt: $2.69B
Cash: $2.20B
Revenue: $38.54B
Revenue: $38.54B
Revenue: $38.54B
Total Equity: $25.89B
Tax Rate: 25.9%
Equity: $25.89B
Total Debt: $2.69B
Cash: $2.20B
Current Liabilities: $21.86B
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $2.69B
Total Equity: $25.89B
Shares: 1,298,000,000
Shares: 1,298,000,000
CapEx: -$1.28B
Shares: 1,298,000,000
Stock Price: $61.22
Net Income: $2.45B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 11:54am (82d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $28.7B | $31.5B | $36.0B | $36.4B | $38.5B |
| Cost of Revenue | $17.5B | $20.2B | $22.3B | $22.2B | $27.6B |
| Gross Profit | $11.3B | $11.3B | $13.8B | $14.3B | $10.9B |
| Operating Expenses | $6.6B | $7.8B | $8.3B | $7.9B | $7.4B |
| Operating Income | $4.7B | $3.5B | $5.5B | $6.3B | $3.5B |
| Net Income | $4.3B | $2.7B | $5.0B | $4.6B | $2.5B |
| EBITDA | $5.8B | $4.6B | $6.7B | $7.6B | $4.9B |
| EPS | $3.06 | $1.97 | $3.64 | $3.44 | $1.89 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $3.04 | $1.96 | $3.62 | $3.42 | $1.89 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 11:34am (82d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $3.6B | $1.9B | $1.9B | $1.4B | $2.2B |
| Total Current Assets | $10.3B | $10.1B | $11.7B | $13.2B | $13.0B |
| Total Assets | $67.1B | $71.2B | $71.4B | $68.5B | $71.5B |
| Current Liabilities | $14.0B | $16.7B | $19.0B | $19.5B | $21.9B |
| Long-Term Debt | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Liabilities | $38.8B | $44.2B | $43.0B | $41.5B | $45.6B |
| Total Equity | $28.3B | $26.9B | $28.4B | $27.0B | $25.9B |
| Retained Earnings | $30.8B | $31.5B | $34.2B | $36.5B | $36.4B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 11:54am (82d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $4.1B | $3.9B | $4.7B | $4.9B | $4.5B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$965.0M | -$906.0M | -$1.1B | -$1.4B | -$1.3B |
| Free Cash Flow | $3.2B | $3.0B | $3.6B | $3.5B | $3.2B |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$833.0M | -$5.3B | $19.0M | -$240.0M | -$15.0M |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | -$326.0M | $1.5B | -$2.2B | -$883.0M | -$483.0M |
| Dividends Paid | -$1.8B | -$2.0B | -$2.2B | -$2.3B | -$2.5B |
| Stock Buybacks | -$2.1B | -$2.0B | -$1.5B | -$2.3B | -$2.4B |
| Net Change in Cash | -$97.0M | -$1.6B | -$64.0M | -$484.0M | $795.0M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 11:54am (82d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +9.7% | +14.4% | +1.2% | +5.8% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +0.5% | +21.7% | +3.6% | -23.3% |
| Operating Income Growth | -24.0% | +55.7% | +15.3% | -44.1% |
| Net Income Growth | -36.8% | +82.5% | -7.0% | -46.8% |
| EBITDA Growth | -19.5% | +44.7% | +13.8% | -35.8% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 11:35am (82d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-30 | $0.50 | — | — | — |
| 2026-03-31 | $0.50 | — | — | — |
| 2025-12-31 | $0.50 | — | — | — |
| 2025-09-30 | $0.50 | — | — | — |
| 2025-06-30 | $0.47 | — | — | — |
| 2025-03-31 | $0.47 | — | — | — |
| 2024-12-31 | $0.47 | — | — | — |
| 2024-09-30 | $0.47 | — | — | — |
| 2024-06-28 | $0.43 | — | — | — |
| 2024-03-27 | $0.43 | — | — | — |
| 2023-12-28 | $0.43 | — | — | — |
| 2023-09-28 | $0.43 | — | — | — |
| 2023-06-29 | $0.39 | — | — | — |
| 2023-03-30 | $0.39 | — | — | — |
| 2022-12-29 | $0.39 | — | — | — |
| 2022-09-29 | $0.39 | — | — | — |
| 2022-06-29 | $0.35 | — | — | — |
| 2022-03-30 | $0.35 | — | — | — |
| 2021-12-30 | $0.35 | — | — | — |
| 2021-09-29 | $0.35 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Not computed yetNarrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
The raw numbers tell a clear deceleration story that the models are correctly identifying but perhaps mispricing. 2025 revenue of $38.54B was up 5.8% YoY, but operating income collapsed from $6.35B to $3.55B — a 44% drop — and net income fell from $4.61B to $2.45B. Gross margin compressed from 39.1% to 28.4% in a single year. That's not "margin normalization," that's a cocoa cost catastrophe (cocoa futures roughly tripled 2023-2024) working through COGS. The Q1 2026 print at $10.08B revenue with 5.6% net margin shows the pressure is still live, though quarterly margins have been noisy (7.6% in Q3 2025, then back down). This is a commodity-shock story, not a demand story — revenue is actually accelerating (recent YoY 5.8% vs 3.4% CAGR).
Where I part company with the synthesis: the $35.97 signal-adjusted fair value is anchoring on trailing depressed earnings and extrapolating a broken margin structure. At normalized ~14% operating margin (2021-2024 average was 12-17%) on $39B revenue, you get ~$5.5B operating income and roughly $4B net income — that's ~$3.00 EPS versus the current ~$1.89. On $3.00 normalized EPS, $61 is 20x, which is a discount to staples peers (KO ~24x, PEP ~22x, HSY ~20x). The market isn't paying 32x for growth; it's paying 32x on trough earnings because it (correctly) sees this as cyclical. The DCF-at-$36 framing implicitly assumes cocoa stays elevated forever and Mondelez cannot re-price — both dubious given confectionery pricing power has historically recovered gross margin within 6-8 quarters of commodity shocks.
That said, the contrarian bear case has real teeth beyond commodity math. Payout ratio is 101.5% — the dividend is being funded from the balance sheet, not earnings, and $3.24B FCF against a ~$2.6B dividend obligation leaves thin cover. Current ratio of 0.59 is genuinely weak. ROIC has fallen to 9.96%, barely above cost of capital, and ROA at 3.4% is anemic. If cocoa normalizes slowly (2027+) and GLP-1 adoption structurally suppresses snacking volumes in developed markets — a real, not hypothetical, risk given Hershey and Nestlé commentary — then normalized margins could reset 200-300bps lower than the 2021-2023 baseline, which would validate something closer to $45-50 fair value, not $36 and not $70. The insider data is useless (all awards, no open-market buys or sells), and I'd flag the "2026-07-01" dates as suspicious — either forward-dated stale data or a data-quality issue worth ignoring.
My verdict: partial dissent from the synthesis. "Overvalued" is directionally defensible but the -41% magnitude is overcooked because it treats a commodity trough as steady-state. I peg fair value at $52-56 assuming margin recovery to ~12% operating margin over 2026-2027, which makes $61 modestly overvalued (~10-15%) rather than dramatically so. The Market Forces call — wait for stabilizing profitability evidence — is the right operational stance. I'd want to see two consecutive quarters of gross margin above 32% before adding, and I'd want cocoa spot below $6,000/ton (currently well above historical norms). The narrative layer is correctly identifying that defensive-multiple support is doing real work here; if that support breaks (rate cuts making staples less attractive relative to duration alternatives, or a broader risk-on rotation), $52 comes into view quickly. Not a short — dividend, brand moat, and mean-reversion optionality make that unattractive — but not a buy at $61 either. The models converge on "overvalued" and I agree with the direction; I just think the price target consensus is anchored too heavily on trailing depressed earnings and underweights the cyclical mean-reversion probability.
GPT Reading
Mondelez looks expensive for what the actual earnings and cash flow are doing right now. The market is paying $78.5B for a business that produced $38.5B of 2025 revenue, just $3.55B of operating income, $2.45B of net income, and $3.24B of free cash flow. That is roughly 32x earnings, about 24x free cash flow, and 16.2x EV/EBITDA for a company whose reported revenue CAGR is only 3.4% and whose earnings CAGR is sharply negative. The most important fact in the data is not that revenue is still growing — it is — but that profitability has compressed hard. Gross profit fell from $14.26B in 2024 to $10.94B in 2025 even as revenue rose from $36.44B to $38.54B; gross margin collapsed from 39.1% to 28.4%. Operating income dropped from $6.35B to $3.55B, and net income nearly halved from $4.61B to $2.45B. That is not a small wobble inside a stable staples story; it is a major deterioration in the earnings engine.
The quarterly pattern says the same thing. Over the last five reported quarters, revenue has held between $9.0B and $10.5B, so demand and pricing are not the issue. But net margins have mostly lived in a weak 4.3% to 7.6% band, versus the 18.2% spike in 2024-12 that looks non-recurring relative to the surrounding quarters. On a trailing four-quarter basis using the latest four quarters shown, revenue is about $39.3B and net income only about $2.61B, still around a 6.6% net margin. For a branded snack company with supposed pricing power, that is underwhelming, especially when investors are still granting it a premium multiple more appropriate for a cleaner margin profile. If margins were merely cyclically depressed, you would want clearer evidence of rebound; instead, 2026-03 still printed only 5.6% net margin on $10.08B revenue. The business is proving resilient at the top line, but not proving that incremental dollars are dropping through.
The balance sheet is fine, which is the best part of the story. Debt of $2.69B against $2.20B cash and $25.89B equity means leverage is not the problem, and debt-to-equity of 0.10 is conservative. Operating cash flow of $4.51B also tells you the franchise is real and not in distress. But that strength is already reflected in the valuation. A 3.3% dividend yield helps, yet the 101% payout ratio is a warning that the current dividend is being measured against depressed earnings, not an obviously comfortable profit base. Low leverage gives management room to wait out cost pressure, but it does not make 32x earnings cheap. At $61, investors are effectively capitalizing a hoped-for normalization in margins before the numbers show it.
The best counterargument is that 2025 may be the wrong earnings base. Revenue is still climbing — from $31.5B in 2022 to $36.0B in 2023, $36.4B in 2024, and $38.5B in 2025 — and the company clearly retains shelf strength and pricing power. If the gross-margin collapse from 39.1% to 28.4% is mostly a commodity or mix event rather than a structural reset, then today’s P/E is artificially inflated by trough earnings. On that view, 2024’s $4.61B net income is closer to normal than 2025’s $2.45B, which would make the stock closer to 17x-18x normalized earnings, much more defensible for a global defensive compounder. The current ratio of 0.59 also matters less in staples with steady cash conversion, and the lack of insider selling is at least not a red flag. I take that seriously. But I weigh it differently because the reported quarterly run-rate after 2024 does not yet show a convincing snapback. If normalization were already underway, I would expect more than mid-single-digit net margins by early 2026.
What would change my mind is straightforward: I need to see margin recovery in the numbers, not in the story. If the next two to three quarters can sustain revenue around $10B while restoring gross margin above 33% and net margin back toward 9%-10%, then annualized earnings power moves back into the $3.8B-$4.5B range and the current stock price becomes much easier to defend. Likewise, free cash flow consistently above $4B without balance-sheet strain would support a premium. Absent that, fair value sits materially below the current quote; for a business growing low-single digits with compressed returns, I would want to pay closer to 18x-20x a more cautious $3.0B-$3.5B earnings base, which points more to the high $40s than the low $60s.
Grok Reading
The numbers tell a story of a franchise that is still selling product but has lost control of its cost structure. Mondelez grew revenue from $36.44B in 2024 to $38.54B in 2025 (+5.8% YoY) and the recent quarterly run-rate is still accelerating—$10.08B in the March 2026 quarter after $10.50B in December—yet net income collapsed from $4.61B to $2.45B and gross profit cratered from $14.26B to $10.94B. Operating margin compressed to 9.2% and net margin to 6.4%; quarterly NI margins have lived in a 4–8% band for five straight periods after an anomalous 18.2% print in late 2024. That is not a soft patch. It is a multi-year cocoa and input-cost shock that has permanently reset the near-term earnings base even while volume-plus-price held up. Free cash flow of $3.24B remains the one bright fundamental, covering the dividend that NI no longer does (payout ratio 101%), and the balance sheet is conservatively levered at 0.10 D/E with only $2.69B of debt. But ROE of 9.5% and ROIC of 10% are mediocre for a supposed quality compounder, and a current ratio of 0.59 flags working-capital tightness underneath the clean leverage optics.
At $61.22 the market is capitalizing this trough at 32.4x earnings, 16.2x EV/EBITDA and roughly 24x trailing FCF. That multiple only makes sense if investors are already underwriting a full snap-back toward the $4.5–5B NI and mid-teens operating margins of 2023–24. Nothing in the last six quarters supports that timing: March 2026 NI was still only $560M on $10B of sales. Revenue CAGR of 3.4% and FCF CAGR of –5.2% over the recent window describe a mature earner whose growth engine is pricing, not unit expansion, and whose cash generation is eroding even before one layers on sugar taxes, health-conscious mix shift, and EM currency noise. The valuation synthesis fair-value cluster around the mid-$30s to high-$40s is directionally correct; the stock is embedding a recovery that has not yet appeared in the P&L.
The strongest counter-argument is that 2025 earnings are an obvious trough and that normalized economics look far cheaper. If cocoa normalizes and gross margin reclaims even 34–36% (still below the prior ~39%), operating profit could re-expand toward $5B+ and the current enterprise value would sit closer to 12–13x mid-cycle EBITDA—perfectly ordinary for a globally diversified snacking portfolio with Oreo, Cadbury and Ritz. FCF of $3.24B already supports the 3.3% yield, the brand moat and emerging-market distribution are real, and defensive staples routinely hold 18–20x earnings through commodity cycles. A buyer who treats $2.45B as non-recurring and anchors on brand durability rather than trailing margins can call $61 a fair entry for a steady compounder. I weigh that case as incomplete: the recovery is multi-year, not automatic, the payout is already stretched, and paying 32x for the hope of reversion while earnings CAGR runs –30% is how defensive multiples become value traps.
I would flip if two consecutive quarters show gross margin back above 33% with organic growth still ≥4%, or if 2026 full-year NI clearly clears $3.8B with FCF re-accelerating above $4B. Absent that evidence, the price remains ahead of the fundamentals.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Mondelez is a mature global snacks/confectionery business throwing off consistent free cash flow ($3.0-3.6B every year 2021-2025) with strong cash conversion (OCF/NI 1.25x, accruals -0.9% of assets, Beneish M -2.4). Per-share discipline is genuine: diluted shares have shrunk from 1.41B to 1.30B (-2.1% CAGR), SBC is a trivial 0.3% of revenue, and buybacks run 16x SBC. Earnings quality mechanics show no red flags. The concern is 2025 operating performance. Revenue kept growing ($28.7B to $38.5B over five years), but gross margin collapsed from 39.1% in 2024 to 28.4% in 2025, operating margin halved from 17.4% to 9.2%, and net income dropped from $4.61B to $2.45B. That is consistent with the well-known cocoa cost shock in the confectionery industry but is a material earnings hit regardless of cause. FCF held up at $3.24B, showing working-capital and cash discipline absorbed some of the P&L pain. Balance sheet is a constraint, not a cushion: $2.20B cash against net debt, and $2.69B short-term debt exceeds liquid cash - refinancing is a routine exposure. Altman Z at 2.3 (grey zone) reflects leverage typical of a stable consumer staple, not distress. Insider tape is neutral - awards and tax withholdings dominate; the only open-market sales are trivial (64 shares total by Stevens).
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Whether 2025 margin compression is cocoa-cost driven and expected to normalize, or reflects structural pricing/elasticity issues
- Hedging policy and duration on cocoa/dairy inputs
- Maturity schedule and refinancing terms on the $2.69B short-term debt
- Organic volume vs price mix in 2025 - is volume declining as prices rose
- Any goodwill/intangibles impairment given the earnings drop (large staples acquirers often carry heavy goodwill)
- Geographic exposure and FX translation impact on the 2025 print
The valuation stack points one direction: composite FV of $47.04 (DCF $52.02, EPV floor $37.09) versus a $61.47 price implies the market is paying about a 31% premium to the blended deserved value, and a 71% premium to the earnings-power floor. Earnings quality is high (score 2), so no haircut is warranted there, and the company-quality lens is Solid - both of which support the higher end of the FV range, call it low-$50s, not a price in the low-$60s. Even generously anchoring on the DCF alone, upside is negative from here. What is priced in: a durable global confectioner that navigates the 2025 gross margin compression (down ~11 points) as cyclical, restores pricing power in 2026, and keeps compounding per-share cash flow. That is a plausible base case for a quality staples franchise, but it is not a discounted one - the market has already awarded MDLZ its steady-compounder multiple. There is no visible margin of safety; if input costs stay sticky or elasticity bites, the EPV floor near $37 is what the stock defends, not the current price. Fair verdict: a good business at a full-to-rich price. I would want to see the mid-$50s before this becomes interesting, and the mid-$40s before it becomes attractive.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- 2026 guidance on pricing actions and gross margin recovery cadence versus cocoa and dairy input costs
- Segment-level volume elasticity - are emerging markets absorbing price or trading down
- FX headwind quantification in constant-currency EPS bridge
- Buyback pace and any incremental capital return that would tighten per-share deserved value
- Whether the 11-point gross margin drop includes one-off charges vs pure input-cost pass-through lag
MDLZ sits in the quietest corner of the tape. With a beta of 0.4 and a Consumer Defensive/Confectioner label, the mildly risk-on regime (score +47, VIX 15.5, S&P near highs) barely reaches this name - risk-on tapes reward high-beta story stocks, not Oreo and Cadbury. So the macro tailwind that is lifting cyclicals and narrative names is essentially neutral-to-slightly-negative here, because rotation into risk pulls flows OUT of defensives like MDLZ. Offsetting that, the 4.65% 10y and stretched 26x market PE keep bond-proxy staples from getting a valuation bid they might otherwise enjoy in a stress tape.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Whether the 10y breaks decisively above 4.75% (would intensify bond-proxy pressure) or rolls back under 4.25% (would give staples a bid)
- Any VIX spike or growth scare that flips the tape risk-off - MDLZ would suddenly get the defensive bid
- Analyst target revisions and any sell-side downgrade citing valuation vs low growth
- GLP-1/health-consciousness narrative flaring back up against confectioners
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
Prediction unavailable. valuation-synthesis has no result for MDLZ — the prediction needs its fair-value anchors.