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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for TC Energy Corporation (TRP) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-27): Designation Low · Gem Score -22 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality 34 · Value -59 · Sentiment 27 (timing only, not weighted)
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profile-header/price-overview— company profile, live quote, market capextended-analysis— the core: three AI lens reads with findings, scores, and the analyst memofuture-predictions— our forward price-band predictionsmarket-narrative/ai-findings/gpt-critique— narrative context, cross-model findings, and an adversarial critique of our own analysis (near the end of the document)- Members-only sections (render as login gates for anonymous readers):
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raw inputs are public-company filings and market data (via licensed data feeds);
every model, score, lens read, and prediction on this page is Delvantic's own analysis.
TC Energy Corporation
TRP NYSETC Energy Corporation is a leading North American energy infrastructure company that primarily focuses on the development, ownership, and operation of major pipelines and power generation assets. The company’s core operations encompass three principal segments: natural gas pipelines, liquids pipelines, and energy production. With a vast natural gas pipeline network that stretches over 92,000 kilometers, TC Energy is responsible for transporting a significant portion of the continent’s natural gas, meeting more than a quarter of North American demand. Its portfolio extends to crude oil pipelines, which play a crucial role in moving Western Canadian resources to key markets, and an energy division that includes power generation assets fueled by natural gas, nuclear, and renewables such as wind and solar. Active in Canada, the United States, and Mexico, TC Energy is known for its long-term, contracted business model, delivering stable cash flows and supporting the infrastructure backbone for critical energy supply. The company holds strategic partnerships, such as those with Mexico’s Comisión Federal de Electricidad to expand the country’s natural gas infrastructure. TC Energy’s ongoing investments in clean energy and grid-scale storage solutions position it at the intersection of reliable conventional energy and the evolving needs of a low-carbon economy.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
TC Energy Corporation is a foreign private issuer — it reports to the U.S. SEC once a year (on Form 20-F or 40-F) rather than filing the quarterly statements (10-Q) that U.S.-domiciled companies must submit. Our financial statements are read directly from SEC filings, so for this company only annual figures exist at the source.
This is a property of how the company files, not missing or broken data — its filing history shows 14 annual reports, the latest filed 2026-02-13, and no quarterly filings . The company may still publish quarterly results on its own investor-relations site.
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 2.35
Total Equity: $26.49B
Shares: 1,040,000,000
Total Debt: $1.11B
Cash: $120.60M
EBITDA: $7.76B
Total Debt: $1.11B
Cash: $120.60M
Revenue: $10.94B
Revenue: $10.94B
Revenue: $10.94B
Total Equity: $26.49B
Tax Rate: 20.9%
Equity: $26.49B
Total Debt: $1.11B
Cash: $120.60M
Current Liabilities: $7.15B
Long-Term Debt: $0.00
Total Debt: $1.11B
Total Equity: $26.49B
Shares: 1,040,000,000
Shares: 1,040,000,000
CapEx: $0.00
Shares: 1,040,000,000
Stock Price: $63.93
Net Income: $2.53B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 12:34pm (82d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $9.6B | $10.8B | $11.4B | $9.9B | $10.9B |
| Cost of Revenue | $62.5M | $383.3M | $371.1M | $155.8M | $149.3M |
| Gross Profit | $9.5B | $10.4B | $11.1B | $9.7B | $10.8B |
| Operating Expenses | $6.6B | $7.8B | $6.7B | $4.0B | $5.0B |
| Operating Income | $2.9B | $2.6B | $4.4B | $5.7B | $5.8B |
| Net Income | $1.4B | $537.0M | $2.1B | $3.4B | $2.5B |
| EBITDA | $4.7B | $4.5B | $6.4B | $7.7B | $7.8B |
| EPS | $1.34 | $0.46 | $1.97 | $3.18 | $2.35 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $1.34 | $0.46 | $1.97 | $3.18 | $2.35 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 12:34pm (82d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $483.1M | $445.1M | $2.6B | $575.0M | $120.6M |
| Total Current Assets | $5.3B | $5.3B | $8.2B | $4.1B | $4.5B |
| Total Assets | $74.8B | $82.1B | $89.8B | $84.9B | $85.2B |
| Current Liabilities | $9.4B | $12.1B | $8.5B | $7.5B | $7.1B |
| Long-Term Debt | — | $1.1B | $1.4B | $2.0B | — |
| Total Liabilities | $50.8B | $57.6B | $61.8B | $57.3B | $58.8B |
| Total Equity | $24.0B | $24.5B | $28.0B | $27.5B | $26.5B |
| Retained Earnings | $2.7B | $587.9M | -$2.2B | -$3.8B | -$4.3B |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 12:34pm (82d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $4.9B | $4.6B | $5.2B | $5.5B | $5.3B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$5.1B | -$6.4B | -$8.8B | -$5.7B | — |
| Free Cash Flow | -$175.2M | -$1.9B | -$3.6B | -$149.3M | — |
| Acquisitions (net) | $0 | $0 | -$220.4M | $0 | $0 |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | -$5.6B | -$960.5M | -$2.7B | -$6.7B | -$4.4B |
| Dividends Paid | -$2.4B | -$2.3B | -$2.0B | -$2.8B | -$2.5B |
| Stock Buybacks | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Change in Cash | -$615.2M | -$38.0M | $2.2B | -$2.1B | -$454.4M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 12:34pm (82d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +11.9% | +6.4% | -13.6% | +10.7% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +8.6% | +6.7% | -12.1% | +10.9% |
| Operating Income Growth | -10.5% | +68.9% | +29.8% | +0.9% |
| Net Income Growth | -61.7% | +290.6% | +60.8% | -25.1% |
| EBITDA Growth | -5.5% | +43.4% | +20.6% | +0.5% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 11, 2026 12:34pm (82d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-30 | $0.62 | — | — | — |
| 2026-03-31 | $0.63 | — | — | — |
| 2025-06-30 | $0.62 | — | — | — |
| 2025-03-31 | $0.60 | — | — | — |
| 2024-12-31 | $0.57 | — | — | — |
| 2024-09-27 | $0.71 | — | — | — |
| 2024-06-28 | $0.70 | — | — | — |
| 2024-03-27 | $0.71 | — | — | — |
| 2023-12-28 | $0.70 | — | — | — |
| 2023-09-28 | $0.69 | — | — | — |
| 2023-06-29 | $0.71 | — | — | — |
| 2023-03-30 | $0.68 | — | — | — |
| 2022-12-29 | $0.66 | — | — | — |
| 2022-09-28 | $0.60 | — | — | — |
| 2022-06-29 | $0.70 | — | — | — |
| 2022-03-30 | $0.72 | — | — | — |
| 2021-12-30 | $0.68 | — | — | — |
| 2021-09-28 | $0.63 | — | — | — |
| 2021-06-29 | $0.71 | — | — | — |
| 2021-03-30 | $0.69 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Not computed yetNarrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
The raw numbers here don't support the synthesis's dramatic 40% overvaluation call. TRP generated $10.94B revenue in 2025 (+10.6% YoY off $9.89B), $5.77B operating income (52.7% op margin), $2.53B net income, and $5.27B operating cash flow. On a $66B market cap that's ~12.5x OCF and ~8.6x EV/EBITDA — dead-normal for a large-cap regulated midstream, not a bubble. The 27x P/E is distorted by depreciation-heavy accounting and a lumpy 2024→2025 NI decline ($3.37B → $2.53B, likely one-time items post-South Bow spin); normalizing on cash flow, TRP looks like a 10-12x FCF utility, not a 65% overvalued momentum stock. The synthesis's $38.16 fair value implies TRP should yield ~6.6% and trade at ~5x EV/EBITDA — a level reserved for structurally impaired midstreams, which TRP demonstrably isn't given contracted gas infrastructure and Coastal GasLink now in-service.
That said, the bear case has real teeth the synthesis undersells rather than oversells. A 99.7% payout ratio on GAAP earnings is not a "dividend compounder" — it's a dividend at the edge. Debt reporting of $1.11B is almost certainly a data error (TRP carries roughly C$50B+ of long-term debt post-spin); the 0.04 D/E and 0.63 current ratio are inconsistent and the current ratio alone signals the real leverage picture. ROA of 2.96% against ROIC of 16.6% is another internal contradiction suggesting the FMP feed is mangled — I'd trust neither in isolation. Revenue CAGR of -2.2% over five years with earnings CAGR of +9.7% tells the actual story: this is a margin-recovery/deleveraging play post-Keystone-XL writedowns and post-South Bow separation, not organic growth. That's fine for income, but it's not worth a growth multiple.
Where I part ways with the models: the Market Forces "value trap / dividend at risk" call is too bearish given $5.27B OCF comfortably covers the ~$2.5B dividend obligation once you strip out maintenance capex realistically (~$2-2.5B for a business this size), leaving thin but real cushion. The Narrative layer's "65% premium is pure sentiment" is overstated — peers ENB and WMB trade at similar EV/EBITDA multiples, so TRP is priced with the group, not above it. The Pre-Flight "dividend-income / mature earner" classification is the only clean read here and I fully agree. The contrarian argument against my own view: if rates stay higher-for-longer, a 3.85% yield on a 99% payout ratio with no organic growth is a losing proposition versus 4.5% risk-free — and that's exactly the de-rating risk that could take TRP from $64 to the $50s without any operational failure. The dividend isn't at risk of a cut; it's at risk of being insufficient.
My verdict: fairly valued, tilting slightly rich but nowhere near the synthesis's $38 anchor. Fair value band is $55-65 based on 9-10x EV/EBITDA and a 4.5-5% required yield on the current payout. At $63.93 you're getting the dividend and roughly flat capital returns — acceptable for an income sleeve, unattractive for a total-return mandate. I dissent from the "overvalued -39.5%" synthesis because the DCF anchor appears to assume no terminal value recovery and treats the payout ratio mechanically rather than adjusting for D&A-heavy earnings. I partially agree with Market Forces on FCF quality concerns but reject the "value trap" framing given contracted cash flows. The real risk isn't valuation — it's that this is a bond substitute in an environment where bonds got cheaper, and any dividend growth deceleration would compress the multiple faster than the models predict.
GPT Reading
What stands out first is how little the income statement supports a $66 billion equity value. Revenue in 2025 was $10.94 billion, still below 2023’s $11.44 billion, so this is not a growth rerating driven by top-line expansion. Operating income has improved materially from $2.61 billion in 2022 to $5.77 billion in 2025, which is real progress, but net income went the wrong way in the latest year: $2.53 billion in 2025 versus $3.37 billion in 2024, a 25% drop. At $63.93, investors are paying 27.2x earnings, 6.1x sales, and 2.5x book for a business with a five-year revenue CAGR of -2.2% and a dividend yield of just 3.85%. For a regulated/capital-intensive midstream utility analogue, that combination looks stretched. The market seems to be capitalizing stability as if it were growth.
The margin profile is also telling, and not in a clean way. Gross margin of 98.6% and operating margin of 52.7% reflect the accounting shape of pipeline infrastructure more than some exceptional business model; this is not a software company. The better anchor is cash generation versus earnings and valuation. Operating cash flow of $5.27 billion is solid, but the absence of disclosed free cash flow in the briefing matters because this is a capex-heavy business where operating cash flow can flatter the economics. That concern is reinforced by the “weak cash flow quality” flag and by the payout ratio sitting at 99.7%. A nearly full-earnings payout is acceptable only if capex is falling hard and free cash flow is about to inflect upward; otherwise, equity holders are funding a premium multiple on distributable stability that has not been fully demonstrated in the numbers provided.
There are also data contradictions that make me less willing to give the company the benefit of the doubt. Reported total debt of just $1.11 billion against $26.49 billion of equity would imply an absurdly conservative balance sheet for a company of this size, and the 4.2% debt-to-equity ratio is not economically intuitive for a North American pipeline operator. I would not lean on that as evidence of safety; it looks more like a classification or extraction issue than the true leverage picture. If you ignore that suspiciously benign leverage snapshot, what remains is a mature infrastructure company earning a 9.5% ROE and 3.0% ROA, with earnings volatility that is higher than the stock’s “bond proxy” framing suggests. On EV/EBITDA of 8.6x, the stock is not outrageously expensive relative to infrastructure peers, but that is the one metric carrying the bull case; the equity multiple, payout math, and no-growth revenue profile all argue the market has already priced in the easy part of the turnaround.
The strongest case against my view is that the business has in fact repaired profitability since 2022. Operating income more than doubled from $2.61 billion to $5.77 billion in three years, net income in 2025 at $2.53 billion is still far above 2022’s $537 million, and operating cash flow of $5.27 billion against a $65.98 billion market cap can support a premium if major projects are largely completed and capex rolls off. In that scenario, the 27x trailing P/E could be temporarily overstating valuation because depreciation, financing effects, or one-off items are depressing net income just before free cash flow converts. A 3.85% dividend yield is not distressed, which implies the market believes the payout is safer than the accounting payout ratio suggests. If management can prove that 2025 was a transition year and that cash available after capex and dividends meaningfully improves in 2026, today’s valuation would look less aggressive than I’m making it sound.
What would change my mind is straightforward: I need to see free cash flow, not just operating cash flow, and I need to see earnings stop sliding. If the next annual update shows free cash flow comfortably covering the dividend by at least 1.2x, net income recovering back above $3.0 billion, and revenue growing beyond the low-single-digit range without further multiple expansion, then a low-to-mid $60s stock price becomes easier to defend. Absent that, this looks like a premium-priced income vehicle whose valuation still reflects a narrative of de-risking and future cash conversion more than the current hard evidence. Below roughly $50, I’d be more open to the stability story; near $64, I think investors are paying too much for predictability that the latest earnings trend does not fully justify.
Grok Reading
The raw numbers describe a high-margin midstream franchise that has stopped growing the top line. Revenue has zigzagged from $9.61B in 2021 to $11.44B in 2023 and back to $10.94B in 2025, producing a five-year revenue CAGR of −2.2% even as the most recent year delivered a 10.7% bounce. Operating income has stabilized near $5.7B the last two years with a 52.7% operating margin and near-100% gross margin—classic regulated pipeline economics—yet net income fell from $3.37B to $2.53B (−25% YoY) and the trailing P/E sits at 27.2x. That multiple is not being earned by growth; it is being paid for stability and the 3.85% dividend. ROIC of 16.6% is respectable and EV/EBITDA of 8.6x is not extreme for infrastructure, but a payout ratio of 99.7% means essentially every dollar of reported earnings is spoken for, leaving no cushion if volumes, rates, or non-cash items disappoint. The balance-sheet print of only $1.11B debt against $26.5B equity (D/E 0.04) would be transformative if accurate, yet cash is a thin $121M and the current ratio is 0.63, while free-cash-flow quality is flagged weak and FCF itself is unreported—so the deleveraging story cannot be taken at face value without better cash conversion evidence.
What stands out is the gap between franchise quality and earnings trajectory. The business converts revenue into operating profit at elite rates and ROE of 9.5% is adequate for a capital-intensive utility-like asset, but the earnings CAGR of 9.7% is largely a recovery from the 2022 trough of $537M rather than a durable expansion path. PS of 6.1x and PB of 2.5x embed the market’s view that these pipes are scarce continental infrastructure; the quantitative fair-value cluster around $38–39 implies the stock is pricing roughly 65% more than steady-state cash generation supports. Recent revenue strength does not offset the multi-year flat-to-down top line or the fact that net margin compressed even while operating margin held. For a mature earner archetype, 27x earnings and a full payout are a rich ask when FCF visibility is poor and macro headwinds are already noted.
The strongest case against an overvalued read is the combination of EV/EBITDA at 8.6x, operating margins above 50%, ROIC above 16%, and the narrative that energy-security and LNG pull-through re-rate midstream as non-discretionary infrastructure. A smart opponent would also seize on the reported near-zero leverage: if net debt is truly trivial, equity duration lengthens and a premium multiple becomes defensible, especially versus peers still carrying heavy project debt. Sector-leader status and the post-Keystone political-risk discount having already been worked off further support the idea that $64 is a normalized infrastructure multiple, not a bubble. I weigh that less heavily because the payout leaves zero retained capital for growth or shocks, earnings just dropped a quarter in a single year, revenue CAGR is negative, and every formal valuation method in the briefing lands near $39. Sentiment recovery from 2023 lows can explain the gap; it does not close it.
I would flip toward fair or undervalued if the next two reported years show FCF cleanly covering the dividend with room to spare, revenue sustaining high-single-digit growth rather than another fade, and net income reclaiming and holding above the $3.3B level without one-time help—particularly if leverage disclosures confirm the fortress balance sheet rather than a data artifact. A dividend cut or another double-digit earnings decline would confirm the short side harder.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
TC Energy is a mature midstream toll-taker with revenue in the $10-11B range and structurally elite gross margins (98.6% in 2025) reflecting regulated/contracted pipeline economics. Operating margin has stepped up dramatically from 24-30% in 2021-22 to 52-58% in 2024-25, and OCF/NI of 3.65x confirms the reported earnings are backed by real cash. FCF swung from deeply negative (-$3.6B in 2023, -$1.9B in 2022) to +$5.27B in 2025 as the capex cycle rolled off - this is the single most important trajectory in the file. Accruals of -3.8% of assets and Beneish M of -2.51 are clean; there is no earnings-manipulation signal. Share count crept from 974M to 1.04B (1.7% CAGR) - modest dilution consistent with a DRIP/scrip-dividend utility, not aggressive equity funding. The concern is the balance sheet: net debt of roughly $1B against $120M of liquid cash understates leverage (the true debt stack on an asset base this large is far bigger), and short-term debt of $1.11B exceeds cash on hand, creating rolling refi exposure. The Altman Z of 0.92 in the distress zone is a real flag in isolation but is a known false-positive pattern for regulated pipelines where debt-funded rate-base assets look 'distressed' on a manufacturing-calibrated model. Still, it signals genuine financial-structure constraint: this business runs on continuous capital-markets access, not on a cash cushion.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Total long-term debt stack, maturity ladder, and average cost of debt from the 10-K/AIF
- Whether the 2025 FCF surge is sustainable or benefits from one-time asset sale proceeds (Coastal GasLink, South Bow spin) rather than operating cash
- Nature of net income swings - impairments, gains on divestitures, deferred tax items
- Regulated vs unregulated revenue mix and contract duration/counterparty quality
- Dividend coverage on a true FCF-minus-maintenance-capex basis
- Post-South Bow-spin capital structure and remaining project backlog commitments
The e2e synthesis pins deserved value at $38.16 composite / $38.69 signal-adjusted, with the EPV floor at $41.24 and anchored PE at $35.07 - a tight cluster well below the $63.77 price, implying roughly 39% downside. Even giving credit for the Solid quality grade, the franchise toll-road cash flows, and a reasonable premium for irreplaceable pipeline assets, deserved value likely sits in the mid-$40s to low-$50s at best. That still leaves the stock 15-25% above a defensible price.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Post-capex FCF run-rate and coverage of the dividend from organic cash flow
- Contracted vs commodity-exposed EBITDA mix and average contract tenor
- Deleveraging trajectory and any asset-sale proceeds applied to debt
- Guidance on rate-base growth and approved return on equity for regulated segments
The macro tape is mildly risk-on with VIX subdued near 15.5 and the S&P near highs, which supports carry trades and yield-bearing infrastructure like TRP. With a beta near 1, TRP doesn't get a big tape kicker, but its ~6% dividend and defensive midstream profile fit the 'buy stable cash flow' mood better than a speculative name would. Recent 10.7% run versus a -2.2% long-term trend shows the narrative pressure has clearly turned positive over the last leg.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Any move in 10y yields above 4.8% - would crack the yield-proxy bid
- LNG export project approvals or delays that anchor the energy-security story
- Analyst target revisions and any dividend coverage commentary in next print
- Sector rotation out of midstream if risk-on tilts more aggressive toward growth
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
Prediction unavailable. valuation-synthesis has no result for TRP — the prediction needs its fair-value anchors.