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What this page is: Delvantic's full research page for Brookfield Corporation (BN) — AI-driven forensic equity research: mechanical valuation models (DCF, EPV, anchored-PE, scenario) plus three independent AI lenses (Quality / Value / Sentiment). Everything below is rendered server-side; you are not missing content that requires JavaScript. All scores are predictions and research opinions, not financial advice.
Our current read (analysis of 2026-08-27): Designation Low · Gem Score -33 (−100…+100 Quality+Value blend) · Quality -39 · Value -29 · Sentiment -28 (timing only, not weighted) · Composite fair value $48.46 vs $45.11 at analysis
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Brookfield Corporation
BN NYSEBrookfield Corporation is a global investment firm based in Toronto, Canada, specializing in alternative asset management and real asset investing. The company’s primary function is to manage and deploy discretionary capital for institutions and individuals through a broad set of investment and retirement solutions. Brookfield operates across several key segments, including asset management and wealth solutions, alongside a portfolio of operating businesses in infrastructure, energy and renewable power, private equity, and real estate. These businesses focus on essential, long-life assets that underpin economic activity, such as regulated utilities, transport and logistics networks, commercial properties, and energy generation assets. Brookfield Corporation serves a diverse client base that includes pension funds, sovereign wealth funds, insurance companies, and retail investors, offering public and private investment products tailored to different risk and return profiles. With offices across the Americas, Europe, the Middle East, and Asia-Pacific, Brookfield plays a significant role in global capital markets by channeling long-term capital into core sectors of the real economy.
Price Overview
Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
This company does not file structured financial statements with the U.S. SEC, so quarterly figures aren't available from our filings-based data engine. Annual figures shown here come from the sources that do cover it.
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 0.49
Total Equity: $166.19B
Shares: 2,667,346,939
Total Debt: $13.80B
Cash: $16.24B
EBITDA: $32.17B
Total Debt: $13.80B
Cash: $16.24B
Revenue: $75.10B
Revenue: $75.10B
Revenue: $75.10B
Total Equity: $166.19B
Tax Rate: 26.0%
Equity: $166.19B
Total Debt: $13.80B
Cash: $16.24B
Current Liabilities: N/A
Long-Term Debt: $13.80B
Total Debt: $13.80B
Total Equity: $166.19B
Shares: 2,667,346,939
Shares: 2,667,346,939
CapEx: -$14.75B
Shares: 2,667,346,939
Stock Price: $45.11
Net Income: $1.31B
Industry Benchmarks
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 14, 2026 12:11am (79d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $75.7B | $92.8B | $95.9B | $86.0B | $75.1B |
| Cost of Revenue | $64.0B | $78.5B | $81.4B | $67.9B | $57.0B |
| Gross Profit | $11.7B | $14.3B | $14.5B | $18.1B | $18.1B |
| Operating Expenses | $116.0M | $122.0M | $69.0M | $76.0M | $78.0M |
| Operating Income | $11.6B | $14.1B | $14.4B | $18.0B | $18.0B |
| Net Income | $4.0B | $2.1B | $1.1B | $641.0M | $1.3B |
| EBITDA | $24.3B | $25.5B | $31.5B | $30.2B | $32.2B |
| EPS | $2.47 | $1.22 | $0.62 | $0.31 | $0.51 |
| EPS (Diluted) | $2.39 | $1.19 | $0.61 | $0.31 | $0.49 |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 6, 2026 7:34am (87d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $12.7B | $14.4B | $11.2B | $15.1B | $16.2B |
| Total Current Assets | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Assets | $391.0B | $441.3B | $490.1B | $490.4B | $519.0B |
| Current Liabilities | — | — | — | — | — |
| Long-Term Debt | — | — | — | — | $13.8B |
| Total Liabilities | $256.3B | $299.4B | $321.9B | $325.0B | $352.8B |
| Total Equity | $134.7B | $141.9B | $168.2B | $165.4B | $166.2B |
| Retained Earnings | — | — | — | — | — |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Aug 6, 2026 7:34am (87d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $7.9B | $8.8B | $6.5B | $7.6B | $11.0B |
| Capital Expenditure | -$6.9B | -$7.2B | -$8.1B | -$11.2B | -$14.8B |
| Free Cash Flow | $993.0M | $1.5B | -$1.6B | -$3.6B | -$3.8B |
| Acquisitions (net) | -$14.6B | -$26.3B | -$12.9B | -$6.5B | -$18.4B |
| Net Debt Issued / (Repaid) | $824.0M | $1.6B | $696.0M | $1.5B | $746.0M |
| Dividends Paid | -$1.3B | -$879.0M | -$436.0M | -$495.0M | -$552.0M |
| Stock Buybacks | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Change in Cash | $3.1B | $1.6B | -$3.4B | $4.5B | $868.0M |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Aug 14, 2026 12:11am (79d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +22.5% | +3.4% | -10.3% | -12.7% |
| Gross Profit Growth | +21.5% | +1.8% | +24.5% | +0.3% |
| Operating Income Growth | +21.7% | +2.2% | +24.6% | +0.3% |
| Net Income Growth | -48.2% | -45.0% | -43.3% | +103.9% |
| EBITDA Growth | +4.8% | +23.5% | -4.1% | +6.6% |
Dividend History (Last 20)
Last updated: Aug 14, 2026 12:11am (79d ago)| Date | Dividend | Declaration | Record | Payment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-06-15 | $0.07 | — | — | — |
| 2026-03-17 | $0.07 | — | — | — |
| 2025-12-16 | $0.06 | — | — | — |
| 2025-09-12 | $0.04 | — | — | — |
| 2025-06-13 | $0.04 | — | — | — |
| 2025-03-14 | $0.09 | — | — | — |
| 2024-12-16 | $0.08 | — | — | — |
| 2024-09-12 | $0.08 | — | — | — |
| 2024-06-13 | $0.08 | — | — | — |
| 2024-03-12 | $0.08 | — | — | — |
| 2023-11-29 | $0.07 | — | — | — |
| 2023-08-30 | $0.03 | — | — | — |
| 2023-05-30 | $0.07 | — | — | — |
| 2023-02-27 | $0.07 | — | — | — |
| 2022-11-29 | $0.11 | — | — | — |
| 2022-08-30 | $0.11 | — | — | — |
| 2022-05-27 | $0.04 | — | — | — |
| 2022-02-25 | $0.11 | — | — | — |
| 2021-11-29 | $0.11 | — | — | — |
| 2021-08-30 | $0.11 | — | — | — |
Deep Analysis
Risk : Reward — upside vs downside from this company's own quarters
Computed 2026-08-26 02:17Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Claude Reading
Looking at the raw numbers first before touching the model outputs: revenue has moved $75.7B → $92.8B → $95.9B → $86.0B → $75.1B over 2021-2025, so the -11.5% "CAGR" is really a round-trip back to 2021 levels — not secular decline but not growth either. Net income collapsed from $3.97B (2021) to $1.31B (2025), a 67% haircut, while equity ballooned to $166B, which is why ROE reads 0.79% and P/B looks like 0.72x. That P/B is the number that matters and it's not a typo — the market is saying it doesn't believe $166B of book. Operating CF of $10.96B against $14.75B capex yielding -$3.79B FCF is the real tell: this is a capital-intensive holdco masquerading (per the pre-flight) as an asset manager. EV/EBITDA of 3.1x is either a gift or a warning depending on whether you trust the consolidated EBITDA of subsidiaries Brookfield doesn't fully own economically.
The model stack is internally contradictory and I'd push back on the synthesis. The "deep_value_turnaround" classification at 0.5 confidence is wrong — BN isn't a turnaround, it's a permanent-capital compounder with an accounting-optics problem, and the pre-flight correctly reclassifies it as a conglomerate. That means the P/E of 92x is not just a "lagging indicator," it's structurally meaningless because GAAP consolidation sweeps in minority-interest earnings and depreciation from infrastructure/real estate assets that mask the fee-related earnings stream (which is what peers like BAM, KKR, APO trade on). The synthesis calling this "fair value at $47" with a +4.3% gap is doing precision theater on inputs that don't measure the right thing. Meanwhile the Thesis Evaluation flags 1.1x interest coverage as a ticking clock — that's the single most important number in this file and the synthesis effectively ignores it. Debt/equity of 0.083 at the parent looks fine, but consolidated leverage across the operating subs is where the 1.1x coverage comes from, and in a higher-for-longer rate regime that is a genuine problem, not a footnote.
The contrarian case against the bull re-rating story: Brookfield has been "about to re-rate" for a decade. The 2022 BAM spinoff was supposed to surface the asset-manager value and it partially did — for BAM, not BN. Holders of BN are structurally left with the co-invest stub plus the GP stake, and the market has consistently refused to pay NAV for that structure. Owner-operator Bruce Flatt is 60, the succession/simplification catalyst is not imminent, and alternative asset managers have compressed multiples 30-40% from 2021 peaks as fundraising slowed. The insider activity list is entirely "J-Other" codes — those are dividend reinvestments or trust movements, not conviction buys, and treating "no insider transactions" as neutral misses that there's also no open-market accumulation despite the alleged discount. FCF of -$3.79B with $10.96B OCF means the business is reinvesting more than it earns in cash — fine if IRRs are 15%+, catastrophic if they're 6%.
My verdict: I dissent partially from the "fair value" synthesis. The composite $47 number is built on metrics the anomaly list itself flags as unreliable, so leaning on a 4% deviation is false precision. The Market Forces signal ("avoid until transparency improves") is closer to right for outside minority holders who cannot underwrite the consolidated leverage. That said, I don't think BN is overvalued in the classic sense — at 0.72x book and 3.1x EV/EBITDA there's real asset backing, and the Flatt-led capital allocation track record over 20 years is genuine alpha. This is a fairly-valued-to-modestly-cheap conglomerate where the discount is deserved until either (a) further structural simplification, (b) interest coverage improves materially above 1.5x, or (c) a distributable-earnings disclosure regime lets outsiders value the fee stream cleanly. At $45 you're paid to wait via the dividend and buybacks but you're not getting the re-rating optionality for free — you're getting it with real leverage risk attached. Starter position defensible for patient holders; not a table-pound.
GPT Reading
At $45, Brookfield looks modestly undervalued, but only because the market is applying a very large skepticism discount to a balance sheet that, on the face of the supplied numbers, is not stressed. The biggest thing that jumps out is the mismatch between earnings optics and enterprise-value optics. A 92x P/E and 0.8% ROE would normally scream avoid, yet the company also shows just 0.72x book on $166.2B of equity, net cash rather than net debt ($16.2B cash versus $13.8B debt), and only 3.1x EV/EBITDA. Those metrics cannot all mean the same thing; they imply reported net income is a poor proxy for underlying value creation here. The income statement supports that view: revenue fell from $95.9B in 2023 to $86.0B in 2024 and again to $75.1B in 2025, a two-year drop of 22%, but gross profit actually rose from $14.5B to $18.1B and operating income from $14.5B to $18.1B. In other words, the business mix is getting smaller in reported revenue terms but richer in margin terms, with gross margin expanding to 24.1% from 15.1% two years earlier. That is not a healthy industrial shrinking; it looks more like portfolio rotation and accounting mix shift inside a conglomerate.
The valuation case therefore rests less on reported EPS and more on whether the book value and operating earnings are remotely trustworthy. If they are even directionally right, $100.8B market cap against $166.2B equity is hard to call expensive. A discount of roughly 39% to book for a platform still producing $11.0B of operating cash flow is meaningful, especially with limited parent-level leverage in the data provided. Even the ugly free cash flow number, negative $3.8B, is more ambiguous than alarming because it is driven by a very large $14.8B of capex. For Brookfield, heavy capex is often an allocation choice tied to controlled assets rather than evidence that the core franchise is unable to self-fund. I would not pay up for it, but I also would not anchor to the “deep value turnaround” label: net income improved from $641M in 2024 to $1.31B in 2025, operating profit held near $18B, and the balance sheet is far from a classic turnaround’s distress profile. The market is effectively valuing Brookfield as a permanently discounted sum-of-the-parts, and that discount looks too wide unless asset values are materially overstated.
The best argument against this bullish lean is that the discount exists for a reason and may be permanent. Revenue is declining fast, down 12.7% year over year and 11.5% on the multi-year CAGR cited, while net margin is only 1.7% despite those eye-catching operating margins around 24%. That gap between operating and net results is exactly where investors get hurt in complex financials: fair-value marks, minority interests, financing structures, and one-off items can make “cheap on book” stay cheap forever. Return on assets of 0.25% and ROE of 0.79% are terrible in isolation, and while I agree those are lagging and noisy, they still tell you common shareholders are not yet seeing the benefit of all that reported asset value. Negative free cash flow also matters more here than bulls may admit because Brookfield is constantly asking investors to underwrite reinvestment, and if that reinvestment does not convert into rising distributable economics, the conglomerate discount should persist. The tiny 0.58% dividend yield does not compensate you much for waiting.
I also take seriously the bear case that Brookfield’s “cheapness” is partly a classification error. Price-to-book is only useful if book approximates realizable value, and alternative asset managers with large controlled operating holdings are exactly where marks can be least testable when markets soften. The prior model’s concern about opacity is valid. A stock at 1.6x sales with falling revenue is not obviously a bargain if the sales base itself is low quality and if net income remains hostage to below-the-line complexity. And while the balance sheet shows net cash at year-end, that does not fully settle risk around look-through leverage embedded in subsidiaries or funds. The market may simply be saying that 0.72x book is fair for a structure that is difficult to analyze and difficult to unlock.
What would change my mind is straightforward. If the next annual cycle shows another double-digit revenue decline without continued gross-profit and operating-income expansion, then the “improving mix” argument breaks and I would treat the low multiple as a value trap. Likewise, if operating cash flow slips materially below $10B while capex remains near $15B, the negative free cash flow stops looking elective. On the other hand, if Brookfield can pair stable-to-growing operating profit above $18B with clearer net income conversion—say NI moving toward $2B+—or if equity keeps compounding while the stock remains below book, then I would become more constructive and think a move into the low-to-mid $50s is justified even without a full conglomerate discount closing.
Grok Reading
The numbers tell a story of deliberate deconsolidation and mix shift, not collapse. Revenue has fallen from $95.9B in 2023 to $86.0B in 2024 to $75.1B in 2025—an 11.5% CAGR decline and a 12.7% drop in the latest year—yet gross profit held flat at roughly $18.1B and operating income at $18.0B, lifting gross and operating margins from the mid-teens to 24.1% and 24.0%. That is the signature of a firm shedding lower-margin operating revenue while retaining fee and carried-interest economics inside a permanent-capital vehicle. Operating cash flow of $10.96B against a market cap of $101B is real cash generation; the −$3.79B free-cash-flow print is almost entirely the $14.75B capex line, which for Brookfield is capital deployment into assets, not maintenance bleed. The balance sheet is fortress-grade on the face of it: $16.24B cash against $13.80B debt, debt-to-equity of 0.083, and $166B of equity against a $101B equity market value—0.72× book. EV/EBITDA of 3.1× and EV/revenue of 1.3× are distressed multiples on a business that is still producing mid-teens-to-twenties operating margins. Net income of $1.31B (up from $641M) and a 92× P/E are the lagging, noisy residual after minorities, marks, and financing—not the right lens. At $45.11 the stock is pricing the asset-management franchise and the investment portfolio at a deep conglomerate haircut; the margin expansion while revenue contracts is the data point the pure multiple screens miss.
I read this as modestly undervalued, not a deep-value moonshot. Book value near $74 per share is not liquid NAV, but even a sustained 0.85–0.90× multiple on stated equity, or a re-rating of the fee franchise toward a fraction of pure-play alternatives managers, supports mid-to-high $50s without heroic assumptions. The pre-flight framing—that the market assigns roughly $30B to the manager and $70B to the portfolio versus higher private marks—is directionally right, and the −4% discount to the composite DCF of ~$47–48 understates the optionality if mix shift continues. Earnings CAGR of +7.6% and the latest +104% NI rebound, while still tiny in absolute margin terms (1.7% net), show the bottom line is stabilizing as the revenue base cleans up. Complexity is real and justifies a discount; it does not justify EV/EBITDA of three times on $18B of operating profit and a net-cash parent balance sheet.
The strongest opposing case is straightforward and quantitative. Net margin of 1.7%, ROE of 0.8%, and ROA of 0.25% are abysmal for a $101B institution and imply either chronic value leakage to minorities and preferreds or earnings quality that never converts. The thesis layer’s 1.1× interest-cover flag, if it reflects consolidated or recourse obligations beyond the $13.8B headline debt, is a genuine ticking constraint the clean parent D/E obscures. Revenue is still shrinking double-digits with no quarterly series to confirm an inflection; if the decline is lost fee-bearing AUM rather than intentional deconsolidation, the margin story reverses. Negative FCF of nearly $4B means equity holders are funding growth that has not yet shown up in ROIC (8.2%) or NAV accretion visible to the public market. Valuation synthesis itself only clears $47–48—about 4% upside—and flags that methods disagree and that the market may already be embedding more growth than will arrive. Transformation risk is not abstract: if the conglomerate cage never opens, the 25–30% holding-company discount is permanent, not a temporary mispricing, and alternatives multiples have already compressed industry-wide. Insider prints are all “J-Other,” offering zero alignment signal. A smart bear argues you are paying a complexity tax for the privilege of owning opaque marks and a sub-1% ROE machine.
I weigh the opposition as real but secondary to the operating-profit stability, the fortress liquidity, and the dirt-cheap enterprise multiples. Opacity justifies caution and caps conviction; it does not make $18B of operating income and 0.72× book a short. What flips me is concrete: two consecutive years of further revenue decline without gross-profit stability (i.e., margins compressing back toward 15%) would kill the mix-shift thesis; a material write-down cycle or consolidated interest cover that stays near 1× through a rate or credit stress event would force a defensive re-rate; and failure of fee-related earnings or disclosed fee-bearing AUM to grow mid-teens over the next four to six quarters would confirm the manager is not worth the re-rating bet. Conversely, a simplification (spin, tracking stock, or clean fee-earnings breakout above ~$5–6B) or FCF turning sustainably positive while book value holds would push me from modest undervalued to aggressive buyer.
Big-3 Panel — where each AI stands
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · separate lenses
Brookfield Corp's headline financials look strange in isolation because BN consolidates asset-heavy operating businesses (real estate, infrastructure, renewables, insurance) alongside the asset manager. Revenue ran $75.7B (2021) to a peak $95.9B (2023) then fell to $75.1B (2025), while GAAP operating margin has been negative every year shown (-42.8% in 2021 improving to -13.6% in 2025) and net income has drifted from $3.97B down to $1.31B. Gross margin expansion from 41.7% to 62.2% suggests mix shift toward fee-related and insurance spread businesses, which is a genuine positive if durable.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Reconcile the 2024 to 2025 diluted share count jump from 1.58B to 2.37B - is this real dilution, a class reclassification, or inclusion of exchangeable BAM units?
- Segment-level FCF at the asset manager (BAM stake) vs consolidated operating subsidiaries - is asset-manager FCF still strongly positive while heavy subsidiary capex drags the consolidated line?
- Distributable earnings and fee-related earnings trend - the metrics management actually runs the business on, not GAAP OpM.
- Insurance segment (Brookfield Reinsurance/Wealth Solutions) contribution to revenue mix and its effect on GM% expansion.
- Debt maturity ladder and non-recourse vs corporate debt split, given negative consolidated FCF.
- Insider transactions and any large secondary or exchange offers explaining the share-count move.
The e2e synthesis puts composite fair value at $48.46 and signal-adjusted at $47.05 against a $45.11 price - a 4-7% gap that is inside the noise band for a complex conglomerate. The only FV method cited is book value at $48.46, which is a reasonable anchor for an asset-heavy alt manager but is exactly the kind of accounting figure the quality lens flags as muddied by consolidated non-wholly-owned subs. That argues for a haircut, not a premium, to the stated FV. Net: deserved value probably sits in the mid-$40s, essentially on top of price. What is priced in: continued fee-related earnings growth, gradual monetizations, and the market accepting the sum-of-parts story. What is NOT deeply discounted: any real 'complexity discount' - the bear case that investors are subsidizing weaker legacy ops is not being handed to you at a bargain here. Bottom line: this is a hold-priced, not a buy-priced, quality name. You need either a lower tape or clearer distributable-earnings disclosure to underwrite upside beyond mid-single digits.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Distributable earnings and fee-related earnings per share in the latest quarter - the real per-share economics behind the book number
- Share count trajectory and any issuance tied to acquisitions or stock comp
- Segment carrying values vs public market marks on BAM, BEP, BIP, BBU stakes for a live sum-of-parts
- Realized carry guidance and monetization pipeline - the swing factor on FV above book
Brookfield sits in an unusual sentiment spot: the macro tape is mildly risk-on (VIX 14.6, S&P at highs) which normally amplifies a high-beta 1.84 name to the upside, but BN's narrative intensity is minimal and the stock trades almost purely on cash-flow fundamentals with essentially no story premium to ride. That means the risk-on tailwind lands softly here - there is no cult bid or momentum crowd to lever it. Meanwhile the 10y at 4.68% and stretched market PE of 26 are a real crosscurrent for an alt-asset manager whose valuation is sensitive to duration and cap rates. The most recent flow is mixed-to-slightly-negative: Q2 headline EPS missed Street estimates, shares ticked lower pre-market, and Michael Burry's high-profile warnings plus lingering private-credit worries force Flatt to publicly defend the industry - never a great look. Offsetting that, distributable earnings grew 15%, deployable capital hit $210B, Oaktree and Just Group closed, and buybacks continued - all narrative-reinforcing for the steady-compounder frame. Net: modest tailwind from tape and durable story, modest headwind from the EPS miss, private-credit narrative overhang, and rate backdrop. The pressures roughly cancel on a low-intensity name.
Verify before trusting this (4)
- Whether private-credit stress headlines escalate and drag the alt-manager cohort lower
- Analyst target revisions post Q2 miss - cuts would confirm sentiment softening
- Any sector rotation into alternative asset managers if rates roll over
- Follow-through selling after the EPS miss versus a quick bid-back
This lens hasn't been run for this ticker yet.
When we made this prediction on Aug 14, 2026, BN was $45.11. We expect it to be $45.20 by Feb 2027, and we consider it great value under $38.00. This is an early model (v0.6.0) — the direction is more reliable than the exact price. Made Aug 14, 2026.
Blue is our prediction, starting the day we made it. Grey is a slower route to the same place — the same destination, taking longer. Black is the actual price, so you can see how we are doing.